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"FIRST DO NO HARM .. .": CAN RESTRICTIONS ON
HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS BE
JUSTIFIED?
This article is dedicated to the memory of Richard Kent
Summers.
Barbara Matthews Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 1991, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)'
published guidelines for the prevention of HIV transmission in
health care settings that sent shock waves through Congress, hospi-
tals, and medical professional societies across the United States.'
Federal legislators responded to increased public fear of health care
worker to patient transmission of the virus by proposing a series of
* B.A., 1983, Santa Clara University; J.D., 1992, Santa Clara University School of
Law; member of the California Bar; Corporate Counsel, Atari Corporation.
1. On October 27, 1992 the CDC changed its name to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention with "CDC" still the official acronym. This change was enacted by Congress
as part of the Preventative Health Amendments of 1992. The name change was made in
recognition of the CDC's leadership role in the prevention of disease, injury, and disabilitiy.
CDC: The Nation's Prevention Agency, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPT. (U.S.
Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Wash., D.C.), Nov. 6, 1992, at No. 44, 1.)
2. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBID-
ITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPT. (U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Wash., D.C.), July
12, 1991, at No. RR-8, I [hereinafter Recommendations for Preventing Transmission].
The medical distinction between Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which causes AIDS will be thoroughly outlined in
part II, infra.
AIDS refers to those who are in the final stages of HIV infection who have specific
illnesses and conditions. In general, current statutes, commentaries, and case law refer to HIV
infection rather than AIDS; following this usage the author will use the terms "HIV infec-
tion," "HIV-positive," and "HIV transmission" except when quoting others or when the spe-
cific term "AIDS" is legally relevant. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMIS-
SION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, AIDS AND
PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1989) [hereinaf-
ter A.B.A. COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND CENTER ON CHILDREN AND
THE LAW]; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, AIDS THE
LEGAL IssuEs, 4 (Discussion Draft 1988) [hereinafter A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING
COMMITTEE].
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bills restricting HIV-infected health care workers' practices; and
similar laws have been proposed and enacted in state legislatures".
The CDC guidelines evoked criticism and conflicting scientific opin-
ions from the medical community, speculation as to the constitution-
ality of restricting health care professionals' activities, and increased
pressure from voters who demanded that their elected officials pro-
tect them against the risk of contracting HIV from their doctors and
dentists.5 Six months after they were issued, the CDC guidelines
were reported to have been under revision, and after a year of con-
troversy and speculation the CDC decided not to modify them.6
This article will examine the issues raised by these recent
guidelines and the subsequently proposed federal legislation regard-
ing HIV-infected health care workers. It will illustrate the conflict-
ing medical opinions and lack of scientific certainty regarding the
actual risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to patient.
In addition, the article will examine the few existing court opinions
that have dealt with hospital restrictions of HIV-infected employees
and will address whether the AIDS crisis is "over-politicized," ' ren-
dering it what some have called a "civil rights issue" rather than the
3. A major portion of this article analyzes the federal response to increased fear of HIV
transmission from health care provider to patient. See infra notes 4, 7, 70. The topic is thor-
oughly discussed infra part VI.
4. The responses to increased fear of HIV transmission from health care provider to
patient in the state legislatures have varied. See infra text accompanying notes 179-86.
5. Congressman William Dannemeyer, R-California, who has introduced numerous
bills into Congress on HIV infection and whose most recent bill, Kimberly Bergalis Patient
and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 2788, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991),
comprises a significant portion of discussion in this article, stated in a press release promoting
the bill: "[Wihen Americans seek medical or dental care, they must be certain that their health
care providers will not inadvertently transmit a deadly virus to them, whether that virus be the
AIDS virus, hepatitis B, or something else." For further discussion of the bill, see infra part
VI.
6. CDC Not Publishing Revised Guidelines on Infected Workers, 7 AIDs ALERT (Am.
Health Consultants, Atlanta, Ga.), Aug. 1992, at 113. This topic is thoroughly discussed infra
notes 138, 139, 174-176 and accompanying text.
7. See Linda Jill Anderson, The AIDS Crisis and Directed Donations, 37 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 451, 456-57 (1991). The author notes:
Other diseases such as mumps, tuberculosis, venereal disease, chickenpox,
syphilis and gonorrhea are tested and reported routinely. In contrast, AIDS,
although a medical disease, is afforded the privilege of choice regarding testing
and reporting. Thus instead of the disease being targeted, it is the fear of dis-
crimination that underlies existing reporting policy. The unusual treatment of
AIDS has led to the conclusion that AIDS is politically protected.
Id.
For further discussion of the "politicization of AIDS," see ROBERT J. JARVIS ET AL.,
AIDS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 41-44 (1991); MICHAEL L. CLOSEN' ET AL., AIDS CASES AND
MATERIALS 177-262 (1989).
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true "public health threat" that it is. s
II. MEDICAL OVERVIEW OF AIDS
Acquired Immune Deficiency (AIDS) is a disease caused by the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), a retrovirus belonging to
the lentivirus group.9 Unlike most other viruses which have their
basic genetic material coded in DNA, HIV is coded in RNA, and is
part of a family of retroviruses whose existence in human beings was
just recently established.' 0 The term "retrovirus" essentially means
"backwards," in that the virus is capable of converting itself into
DNA and incorporating itself into the genetic material of the in-
fected person." These retroviruses, which are widespread among
many animals, are characterized by their integration into host cells
facilitated by the enzyme reverse transcriptase which enables the
process of viral infection to occur.'"
HIV attacks CD4 lymphocytes, the white blood cells which
help fight infection and are largely responsible for many functions of
the human immune system.'" As a result of this viral attack, the
invaded helper cells become crippled and die. As the total number of
CD4 cells decline, the immune system slowly becomes weaker, and
thus patients with HIV become susceptible to a wide range of oppor-
tunistic infections associated with "full-blown" AIDS."
The actual disease of AIDS represents the final stage of HIV
infection which has been clinically divided by the CDC into four
stages.' In the first, some, but not all, of those who contract the
8. Senator Jesse Helms, R-North Carolina, excerpted from his speech to the Senate in
mid-July, 1991, in support of his amendment requiring AIDS testing of all health care work-
ers performing invasive procedures. Sen. Jesse Helms, The AIDS-infected Physician, Are
Criminal Penalties Necessary to Protect the Public Health? Yes: Protect Innocent Victims,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 46. The Helms amendment is thoroughly examined infra part VI.
9. Harold L. Hirsch, A Visitation with AIDS, Part X: Medical Dilemma, Legal &
Ethical Quagmire, 37 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 417, 417 (1991). "Lentivirus" is a subfamily of
the retrovirus group. Id.
10. DONALD H.J. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIDS 7
(1991).
11. Anderson, supra note 7, at 451-52.
12. Id. at 452; see also HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at 7.
13. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 417.
14. Id.; see also A. Alyce Werdell, Mandatory AIDS Testing: The Legal, Ethical and
Practical Issues, 5 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 155, 158 (1990). The author
defines "full-blown" AIDS as the final stage of HIV infection where the immune system is so
weak that the body is unable to fight off opportunistic infections - those which do not ordina-
rily cause disease in human beings. Because the AIDS patient's immune system is so weak-
ened, these infections often will cause the AIDS patient's death.
15. A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 12.
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virus initially suffer from flu-like symptoms which usually appear
two to six weeks after HIV infection; symptoms may include head-
ache, diarrhea, sore throat, swollen lymph nodes, or a rash."' The
second stage, termed asymptomatic HIV infection, is a period during
which infected individuals remain healthy, gradually developing
symptoms associated with HIV infection." This incubation stage can
be characterized by a latency period in some of up to eight to ten
years before the onset of AIDS."8 And, once infected, the HIV-posi-
tive person can pass the virus to another person until the day he or
she dies. 9 This asymptomatic "carrier state" can be detected by evi-
dence of HIV infection upon laboratory testing."
In the third stage, persons infected with HIV develop sympto-
matic HIV infection, a phase in which individuals develop various
clinical signs including swollen lymph nodes, weight loss, fever, diar-
rhea, skin tumors, and other conditions."' The fourth phase, AIDS
or "full-blown" AIDS, encompasses the clinical diagnosis represent-
ing the end stage of HIV infection. 2 This stage is marked by specific
symptoms and diseases identified by the CDC, such as Kaposi's sar-
coma and pneumocystis carinii pneumonia.2 8
HIV has been isolated in blood, semen, saliva, tears, vaginal
secretions, urine, breast milk, cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, and
amniotic fluid; but isolation of the virus from a specific body fluid
16. Anderson, supra note 7, at 452.
17. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND CENTER ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 8.
18. Id.
19. Jerry Adler et al., Living with the Virus, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 63; see also
Anderson, supra note 7, at 452.
20. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at 9.
21. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND CENTER ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 8.
22. Id.; see also HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at 8.
23. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND CENTER ON CHILDREN
AND THE LAW, supra note 2, at 8.
The CDC has further subdivided this final stage of the disease, known as CDC IV into
five specific subcategories.
Kaposi's sarcoma is a cancerous lesion, visually obvious on the skin, which is blue-purple
in color. It can appear anywhere on the HIV-infected person. In addition, it can occur in the
palate, gastrointestinal tract, and even on the inner surface of the eyelids. CLOSEN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 178. Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, a previously rare type of lung infection,
is the most widely known opportunistic infection to inflict persons infected with HIV. A.B.A.
AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 12. On January 1, 1993, the CDC
broadened its definition of "full-blown" AIDS to include cervical cancer, pulmonary tubercu-
losis, and recurrent pneumonia as indicator illnesses. U.S. Broadens Definition of AIDS, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 1, 1993, at 20A.
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does not mean that the fluid is a viable source of transmission.i 4 To
date, only blood, semen, vaginal secretions and breast milk have been
directly linked to HIV transmission. 5 Host sites best suited for
transmission of infection after exposure appear to be the blood sys-
tem, breaks in the skin, and the soft tissues of sexual organs.26 Prior
to 1990, only four methods of transmission had been documented:
sexual contact; parenteral exposure to blood and blood products
through needle-sharing and transfusions; transmission by infected
mothers to their fetuses and infants in utero, during labor and deliv-
ery and through breastfeeding; and occupational exposure through
needlestick injury or mucous membrane exposure. 27 The CDC em-
phasizes that HIV cannot be transmitted by nonsexual "casual" con-
tact 28, and that people with AIDS can be cared for in the home
without high risk of infection to caregivers or other family
members.29
On July 27, 1990 the CDC published a Morbidity & Mortality
Weekly Report that contained an article entitled "Possible Transmis-
sion of Human Immunodeficiency Virus to Patient During an Inva-
sive Dental Procedure." 0 A 22-year old woman with no other risk
factors for HIV infection had been diagnosed with AIDS twenty-
four months after being treated by her HIV-infected dentist."' Until
this case, authorities had asserted that transmission of HIV from a
health care professional to a patient had a low, but not zero,
probability. 2 Six months later, the CDC published another Morbid-
ity & Mortality Weekly Report on the case entitled "Update: Trans-
mission of HIV Infection during an Invasive Dental Proce-
dure-Florida." 3 The word "possible" had been dropped from the
title of the CDC report, and an additional four patients of the dentist
24. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at 23.
25. Id.
26. A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 11.
27. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at 23; see also A.B.A. AIDS COORDINAT-
ING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 11.
28. A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 11.
29. Id.; see also Hirsch, supra note 9, at 438.
30. Possible Transmission of HIV to Patient During an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. Rvr. (U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Wash.,
D.C.), July 27, 1990, at 489.
31. Id.
32. Barbara Gerbert et al., Possible Health Care Professional-to-Patient HIV Trans-
mission, 265 JAMA 1845, 1845 (1991).
33. CDC Update: Transmission of HIV Infection during an Invasive Dental Proce-
dure, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY RPT. (Dep't of Health & Hum. Serv., Wash.,
D.C.), Jan. 18, 1991, at 21.
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with no other risk factors for the virus were identified as infected
with HIV.34
The responses to the July, 1990 CDC report were immediate,
and were covered in both the lay and professional press. 5 Whereas
the mainstream press coverage reflected extreme public concern over
the issue, the professional medical societies responded quietly to the
first report and much more strongly to the second.3" Shortly after
publication of the January 1991 updated report the American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) and the American Dental Association (ADA)
issued new recommendations for HIV-infected health care profes-
sionals, calling for these individuals to inform their patients of their
HIV status or refrain from performing invasive procedures.3  These
recommendations were then followed by new CDC guidelines in
July of 1991.11 Thus a new mode of HIV transmission was officially
documented, and a new medical and political controversy created.
III. A DECADE OF EPIDEMIC
On June 5, 1991, the nation passed the official decade mark of
the AIDS epidemic. The date represented ten years since the CDC
published a report of a cluster of mysterious and profound immune
deficiency cases associated with pneumocystis pneumonia and other
opportunistic infections in Los Angeles. 9 Within weeks of the MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY findings, similar cases were being
reported in other parts of the country-and even before the isolation
of HIV in 1983 and the advent of serologic testing in 1985 it was
clear that a major epidemic had begun.4 As the initial cases of this
mystery disease were reported, it became clear that its first victims
were primarily male homosexuals, followed by intravenous drug
users, and Haitian immigrants and refugees."1 Thus, certain "high
34. Id.
35. See Gerbert, supra note 32, at 1845. The authors cite the following headlines in
response to the July, 1990 CDC report: "AIDS case puzzles, troubles experts: Could dentist
have infected patient with HIV while extracting teeth?" (quoting from the SAN FRANCISCO
EXAM., July 27, 1990, at Al); "Confusion about danger to patients." (quoting from the SAN
FRANCISCO SUNDAY EXAM. & CHRON., July 29, 1990, at A3); and "Many dental appoint-
ments canceled after HIV report" (quoting from the SAN FRANCISCO CHRON. July 28, 1990,
at A3). Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1848.
38. See Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 2.
39. Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324, NEW. ENG. J. MED.,
1498, 1498 (1991).
40. Id.
41. RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS
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risk groups" were identified, and unlike other major epidemics,
AIDS was not initially seen as threatening the entire population."'
The disease was originally referred to by many as the "gay pneumo-
nia" and later as the "gay plague."4 s
Although the force and threat of the epidemic have been com-
pared to those of other epidemics in the United States, many com-
mentators note that the AIDS epidemic carries with it unique social
issues which complicate the public's response to it:
Unlike the polio epidemic of the 1950's or the influenza pan-
demic of 1918, AIDS tends to afflict people who are for one
reason or another the objects of discrimination. Although in-
creasingly a disease of inner-city black and Hispanic intrave-
nous drug abusers of both sexes and their sexual partners,
AIDS was at first almost exclusively a disease of homosexual
men. It therefore carried the stigma of any sexually transmitted
disease, but unlike syphilis or gonorrhea, it also carried the
stigma of homosexuality-a double burden."
Other commentators emphasize the "politicization" of this epidemic,
noting that AIDS has become fuel for the moral majority:
As the spread of AIDS became linked in the public imagination
to the very presence of homosexuals . . . the gay visibility and
affirmation of the past decade allowed for some very nasty
scapegoating. AIDS came along just when the old religious,
moral and cultural arguments against homosexuality seemed to
be collapsing . . . . [Rlight-wing moralists sought to shore up
traditional condemnations of homosexuality; AIDS provided a
godsend to them.45
Thus from the outset of the AIDS epidemic discrimination has
EPIDEMIC 123-135 (1988).
The author highly recommends Shilts' book to those interested in the political and medi-
cal development of AIDS. Shilts traces the discovery of the epidemic in 1981 including the
various names initially given the disease such as "CAIDS," "ACIDS," and "GRID", while
documenting CDC activity vis-a-vis tracking the initial "mystery diseases" and the exponential
growth of the epidemic. Id. Of additional interest in Shilts' work is his reporting of the race
between the French and Americans in isolating and naming the virus causing this tragic dis-
ease. Id.
42. CLOSEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 178.
43. Id. at 65; see also SHILTS, supra note 41, at 152. Shilts documents the early devel-
opment of the epidemic: "By May 18 [19821, 355 biopsy-confirmed GRID cases had been
counted in twenty states. . . . About 79 percent of all cases were among gay or bisexual men.
Nearly 12 percent were among heterosexual men who were intravenous drug users, although
the CDC still wasn't saying this for public consumption." Id.
44. Angell, supra note 39, at 1498.
45. CLOSEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 179.
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characterized the disease. In addition, AIDS has other qualities that
render it subject .to extreme controversy: (1) it is always fatal; 6 (2)
the epidemic is largely "invisible" because those with full-blown
AIDS constitute only a fraction of those who are infected with
HIV41 (3) HIV has been found to have a median incubation period
of almost ten years, during which time the infected person is a car-
rier of the virus, fully able to transmit it, but without any visible
symptoms;4" and (4) the activities that initially spread the HIV virus
(sex and drugs) are private and fundamentally not amenable to the
coercive power of the state."9 These factors set the epidemic apart
from other public health issues, creating what commentators refer to
as "a paradox of epidemiological and medical facts;" 50 "a pandemic
[that] has challenged some of our well-worn moral values . . . con-
cern[ing] those with liberty, equality, and privacy;"51 and "the most
difficult ethical question now at issue in medicine."' 52
Since AIDS was first identified in 1981, its exponential growth
has shocked the United States. In the first nine months after the dis-
ease was recognized and before any official reporting system had
beenr established, 355 cases were identified in 20 states;58 nineteen
months into the epidemic the rate of AIDS cases reached 1,025 cases
nationally-twenty-five percent of which had been reported in just
the two months prior to the compilation of the reported figures . 4
46. Scott H. Isaacman, The Other Side of the Coin: HIV-Infected Health Care Workers,
9 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 439, 454 (1990) (quoting C. Everett Koop, former United States
Surgeon General).
The author quotes the former Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop as follows:
When you look at all the reported cases of AIDS since 1981, and the reported
deaths as well, the mortality rate is about 56%, which is bad enough. But when
you look back at those persons who had AIDS in 1981, you discover that 92% of
them have since died of the disease. And in my book, a mortality rate of 92% is
as bad as a rate of 100%.
Id.
47. David C. Wyld & Sam D. Cappel, The Big Easy? Legal and Managerial Perspec-
tives on AIDS and Health Care Delivery in the 1990s, 5 AIDS & PuB. POL'Y J., 99, 99
(1990).
48. Id.
49. Sheldon H. Landesman, The HIV-Positive Health Professional: Policy Options for
Individuals, Institutions and States, 151 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 655, 655
(1991).
50. Wyld & Cappel, supra note 47, at 99.
51. John Kleinig, The Ethical Challenge of AIDS to Traditional Liberal Values, 5
AIDS & PUB. POL'Y J. 42, 42 (1989).
52. Wyld & Cappel, supra note 47, at 99, citing Edmund D. Pellegrino, Medical Eth-
ics: Entering the Post-Hippocratic Era, I J. AM. BOARD. FAM. PRAC., 230 (1988).
53. SHILTS, supra note 41, at 152.
54. Id. at 233.
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Today, of course, the numbers of diagnosed AIDS cases are stagger-
ing, and the CDC estimates that between 1 million and 1.5 million
people in the United States are infected with HIV.55 Whereas homo-
sexual and bisexual men accounted for over 79% of those diagnosed
with AIDS in 1982, and intravenous drug users 12%,56 today's
figures reveal that the spread of the disease in the homosexual com-
munity has slowed, with a substantial number of cases being re-
ported in heterosexual non-drug users.57 Homosexual and bisexual
males are now estimated to account for approximately 65% of those
infected, non-homosexual intravenous drug users 22%, heterosexuals
5.7%, and undetermined cases approximately 3.7%.6' In March of
1990 reported cases of AIDS reached approximately 129,000;59 in
January of 1991, 165,000;'o and in September of 1991, 195,000.6"
And it is estimated that the number of cases in 1992 will reach over
300,000.2 While examining these figures, it is important to keep in
mind the length of the average incubation period for HIV; the peo-
ple listed with AIDS above were largely infected in the 1980s, and
those who are HIV-positive today will become the AIDS patients of
the next century. Because of the sheer magnitude of the epidemic
and its tragic effects on its victims, over the past decade AIDS has
changed its status from that of an obscure and mysterious disease
known only to the medical and homosexual communities to that of a
"household word" covered daily in the media, of concern to most
Americans, and frightening to many others."
As discussed briefly above, on July 27, 1990, the CDC pub-
lished a Morbidity & Mortality Weekly report that contained cover-
age of "possible" HIV transmission from a dentist to his patient;"
this report was updated six months later with the addition of four
other patients who were identified as infected with HIV.65 At the
time of the publications the patients were referred to as patients "A-
E", anonymous and unfortunate persons who had tested HIV-posi-
55. Living with the Virus, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 63.
56. SHILTS, supra note 41, at 65.
57. Magic's Message, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 59.
58. Id.
59. Update, AIDS ALERT, June 1990, at 119.
60. Update, AIDS ALERT, Apr. 1991, at 78.
61. Update, AIDS ALERT, Dec. 1991, at 242.
62. Karen Markus, Patients with HIV, CAL. NURSING, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 20 (citing
U.S. Public Health Service predictions of approximately 365,000 persons diagnosed as having
AIDS by the end of 1992).
63. Angell, supra note 39, at 1498.
64. See supra note 33.
65. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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tive, some of whom had already begun to show symptoms of AIDS.6
Patient "A", the first person ever officially documented as con-
tracting HIV from her dentist, Dr. David Acer, was later identified
as Kimberly Bergalis, a twenty-three year old college student whose
tragic struggle with AIDS became known across the nation. 7 As her
case was covered in national media and on television, Americans
were confronted with their greatest fears about AIDS. Whereas it
had been believed that contracting HIV was somehow associated
with voluntary lifestyle choices (i.e. sexual preference, drug use, and
promiscuity) or the unfortunate early cases of blood transfusion and
organ transplants, now proven safe after the advent of HIV blood
screening,68 it now appeared that the invisible killer could be trans-
mitted by one's seemingly healthy dentist or physician. In the final
months of her life, Ms. Bergalis joined forces with legislators who
clamored for restrictions of HIV-infected health care workers and
wrote an open letter to Florida public health officials in which she
stated, "I blame every one of you bastards ... [who] knew Dr. Acer
was infected ... and stood by not doing a damn thing about it ....
If laws are not formed to provide protection, then my suffering and
death was in vain. '"69
Thus the summer of 1991 marked the close of the first decade
of the AIDS epidemic, with staggering statistics, the growing spread
of the disease into the heterosexual population, and the first docu-
mented cases of dentist to patient transmission of HIV. As soon as
the CDC guidelines were released, legislation was introduced into
Congress calling for restrictions of HIV-infected health care work-
ers." And public opinion polls revealed that over 90% of Americans
favored requiring HIV-infected health care workers to reveal their
HIV status to patients.7 1
66. CDC Update: Transmission of HIV to a Patient during an Invasive Dental Proce-
dure, supra note 33, at 26.
67. Doctors with AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 49.
68. A full discussion of blood screening and the early cases of AIDS transmitted by
blood transfusion is beyond the scope of this article and involves an in-depth study of early
CDC activities vis i vis the isolation and discovery of the virus, and the eventual realization by
the CDC that the virus was being spread by blood transfusions. For a detailed report on these
topics, see SHILTS, supra note 41, at 206-346.
69. Doctors with Aids, supra note 67, at 49, 52.
For a thorough discussion of the proposed bill bearing Ms. Bergalis' name, see infra part
VI.
70. The bills introduced into Congress will be thoroughly examined in Part VI.
71. Doctors with Aids, supra note 67, at 49, 51. For this Newsweek Poll, the Gallup
Organization interviewed a national sample of 618 adults by telephone on June 20, 1991. The
exact breakdowns of the poll were as follows: "[Q]. Which of the following kinds of health-
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The CDC guidelines, the Bergalis case, and the proposed legis-
lation evoked controversy, conflicting medical opinions as to the gen-
uine risk of physician to patient transmission, and criticism of both
the federal government and the CDC because of their lack of deci-
siveness and uniformity in handling the AIDS epidemic." Thus the
second decade of the epidemic started, with new groups claiming dis-
crimination, factions being created within the medical community,
and commentators stating that the medical profession was entering
the "post-Hippocratic era," with HIV infection as the most difficult
ethical question at issue in medicine.7"
IV. CDC GUIDELINES: JULY, 1991
Officially entitled "Recommendations for Preventing Transmis-
sion of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to
Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures," the CDC
guidelines, as they are better-known, were premised upon the fact
that they were interim until further data on HIV transmission was
available. 4 Prior to this publication, the CDC had recommended ad-
herence to "universal precautions" to reduce the risk of occupational
HIV transmission to health care workers. 75 The precautions recom-
mended primarily that all patients be considered HIV/HBV carriers
and required that health care workers routinely use appropriate bar-
rier protection to prevent skin to mucous membrane exposure when
contact with blood or body fluids is anticipated. Gloves were recom-
mended for the touching of any body fluids, and eyewear, masks and
gowns were recommended during procedures that were likely to gen-
erate droplets or splashes of blood.76 In addition, the universal pre-
cautions required thorough handwashing, procedures promoting the
prevention of injury caused by needles, scalpels and other sharp in-
struments, and proper disposal of such sharp instruments.77 The rec-
ommendations also instructed that health care workers with exuda-
tive lesions or weeping dermatitis should refrain from all direct
care workers should be required to tell patients if they are infected with the AIDS virus? [A].
95% surgeons, 94% all physicians, 94% dentists, 90% all health care workers." Id.
72. See infra parts V., VI.
73. Wyld & Cappel, supra note 47, at 99.
74. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 1, at 2.
75. Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to
Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L. REV. 12, 24 (1989). The
official name of the precautions are the "universal blood and body fluid precautions" and blood
and body fluids are abbreviated as "BBFs." Id.
76. Gostin, supra note 75, at 25.
77. id.
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patient care.7 Under the subtopic of "occupational risk of acquisi-
tion" the precautions recommended counselling of HIV-infected
workers as to their risks of acquiring infections from their patients
and recommended that the health care worker's (HCW's) personal
physician and the appropriate hospital personnel should determine
on an individual basis whether the HCW can adequately and safely
perform patient-care duties, indicating work assignment changes
where necessary.7
As to the question of possible health care worker to patient
transmission of HIV, the 1985 precautions stated that "whether ad-
ditional restrictions are indicated for HCWs who perform invasive
procedures is currently being considered;"" ° and a 1987 update of
these recommendations provided:
The question of whether workers infected with
HIV-especially those who perform invasive procedures-can
adequately and safely be allowed to perform patient care duties
or whether their work assignments should be changed must be
determined on an individual basis. These decisions should be
made by the health care worker's personal physicians in con-
junction with the medical director and personnel health service
staff of the employing institution or hospital.81
The July 1991 guidelines emphasized adherence to universal
precautions and still required that blood and other bodily fluids be
handled as if HIV-and HBV-infected."2 In addition, the guidelines
were premised upon the following considerations: HBV- or HIV-
infected health care workers who adhere to universal precautions
and do not perform invasive procedures posed no risk of HBV or
HIV transmission to patients, and that HIV is transmitted much less
readily than HBV.s8 The CDC used an HBV transmission model to
outline "exposure prone" procedures and defined the characteristics
of such procedures as follows:
Despite adherence to the principles of universal precautions,
certain invasive surgical and dental procedures have been impli-
cated in the transmission of HBV from infected HCWS to pa-
tients, and should be considered exposure-prone. Reported ex-
78. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note 1 at 2.
79. Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital Dist. No. 1, 714 F..Supp. 1377,
1381-82 (E.D. La. 1980). This case will be discussed at length infra part VII.C.
80. Id. at 1381.
81. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at 38, 47.
82. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission, supra note I at 2.
83. Id.
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amples include certain oral, cardiothoracic, colorectal, and
obstetric/gynecologic procedures.
Characteristics of exposure-prone procedures include digital
palpation of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous
presence of the HCW's fingers and a needle or other sharp in-
strument or object in a poorly visualized or highly confined ana-
tomic site. Performance of exposure-prone procedures presents a
recognized risk of percutaneous injury to the HCW, and-if
such injury occurs-the HCW's blood is likely to contact the
patient's body cavity, subcutaneous tissues, and/or mucous
membranes."'
As published in July of 1991, the CDC guidelines left the iden-
tification of exposure-prone procedures to the "medical/surgical/
dental organizations and institutions at which the procedures are
performed.""5 And in June, 1992, the CDC notified each state that
it would be for state health departments to decide on a case-by-case
basis which procedures are exposure-prone, taking into consideration
the specific procedure as well as the skill, technique, and possible
impairment of the infected health care worker.8 " The 1991 guide-
lines also recommended that health care workers comply with cur-
rent guidelines regarding disinfection and sterilization of reusable
devices used in invasive procedures.8 7 In an appendix to the report,
the CDC defined "invasive procedure" as follows:
[S]urgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs or repair of ma-
jor traumatic injuries associated with any of the following: 1)an
operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpa-
tient setting, including both physicians' and dentists' offices;
2)cardiac catheterization and angiographic procedures; 3)vagi-
nal or caesarean delivery or other invasive obstetric proce-
dure . . . ; 4)the manipulation, cutting or removal or any oral
or perioral tissues, including tooth structure, during which
bleeding occurs or the potential for bleeding exists.88
The CDC did not recommend mandatory testing of health care
workers because the "current assessment of risk ... [did] not support
the diversion of resources that would be required to implement
mandatory testing programs."8 9 Of the greatest impact in the guide-
84. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 5.
86. CDC Not Publishing Revised Guidelines on Infected Workers, AIDS ALERT, Au-
gust 1992, 113, 113.
87. See supra note 73, at 5.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 6.
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lines were the following recommendations:
[1] HCWs who perform exposure-prone procedures know their
HIV status;
[2] [Those] . . . infected should not perform exposure-prone pro-
cedures unless they have sought counsel from an expert review
panel and have been advised under what circumstances, if any,
they may continue these procedures.
[3] Such circumstances would include notifying prospective pa-
tients of the HCW's seropositivity before they undergo expo-
sure-prone invasive procedures.
[4] The review panel should include experts . . . [who] might
include a)the HCW's personal physician(s) b) an infectious dis-
ease specialist ... c) a health professional with expertise in the
procedures performed by the HCW, and d) state or local public
health officials. If the HCW's practice is institutionally based,
the expert review panel might also include a member of the in-
fection-control committee, preferably a hospital epidemiologist.
[5] HCWs whose practices are modified because of their . . .
infection status should, whenever possible, be provided opportu-
nities to continue appropriate patient-care activities. Career
counseling and job retraining should be encouraged.' 0
The CDC concluded its report by outlining "additional needs"
regarding its research in this important area, including:
[1] [A] clearer definition of ... the circumstances of blood con-
tact between patients and HCWs during invasive procedures.
[2] Development . . . of new devices, protective barriers, and
techniques that may prevent such blood contact.
[3] More information on the potential for HIV and HBV trans-
mission through contaminated instruments.
[4] Improvements in sterilization and disinfection for certain re-
usable equipment and devices.
[5] Identification of factors that may influence the likelihood of
HIV or HBV transmission after exposure to HIV- or HBV-
infected blood."
The responses to the CDC guidelines were immediate. Within
a week of their publication, two measures were passed in the Senate,
one which required criminal penalties against HIV-infected health
care workers who continued to perform invasive procedures without
telling their patients of their status, and another that would require
that states adopt the guidelines or risk non-receipt of federal public
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. Id. at 6.
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health funds.92 AIDS newsletters for medical professionals predicted
that "mandatory HIV testing of surgeons and dentists [was] 'inevita-
ble',"" and that "four to five patients a year may be infected by
surgery." '94 Sharp criticism of the guidelines was reflected in state-
ments that "these new recommendations elevate prejudice, politics,
and public relations over sound public policy. '" 5
The Bergalis case moved to the center of discussions in both lay
and professional newspapers, magazines and journals-and the med-
ical debate as to the actual risk of physician to patient transmission
that had started with the January 1991 CDC update regarding Ber-
galis escalated. 96 The CDC came under increased criticism from
both pro-restriction and anti-restriction factions and was plagued by
adverse publicity,9" epitomized by a chief officer's statement that "for
years we've been expecting a case like this." 8
V. THE RISK OF HIV TRANSMISSION FROM HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONAL TO PATIENT
In March of 1991 the CDC reported from a compilation of doc-
umented cases that over 6,400 health care workers had contracted
AIDS since the beginning of the epidemic.99 In November of 1991,
92. Id.
93. 6 AIDS ALERT (Am. Health Consultants, Atlanta, Ga.), Sept., 1991, at 165.
94. Four to Five Patients a Year May be Affected During Surgery, 6 AIDS ALERT
(Am. Health Consultants, Atlanta, Ga.), Aug. 1991, at 151.
95. Hysteria Trumps Reason on Health Worker Policy, 4 AIDS UPDATE (Lambda Le-
gal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), July 1991, at 3.
96. See Doctors with AIDS, supra note 67, at 49. This article noted that the cover story
of Newsweek was entitled "Doctors with AIDS." The cover featured a photograph of an
HIV-infected physician with a sub-topic to the title which stated: "Dr. Richard Duff retired
last week, three and a half years after he got sick. Chances are none of his patients will
contract the disease. But stories like his have Americans scared and arguing about the right of
patients and doctors to know each other's HIV status." Id.; see also Frank S. Rhame, The
HIV-Infected Surgeon, 264 JAMA 507 (1990). The author states, "[njo surgeon-to-patient
HIV transmission has been reported, but it is an example of the collective denial that has
afflicted past HIV-related deliberations to avoid rigorous consideration of the issue. Id. The
debate as to the risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to patient is thoroughly
discussed infra part V.
97. Gerbert et al., supra note 32, at 1847.
98. Id. (quoting Harold Jaffe, MD, CDC deputy director for AIDS science).
99. Doctors with Aids, supra note 67, at 49-50. Newsweek broke down the CDC
figures as follows:
Nurses 1,358
Health Aides 1,101
Technicians 941
Physicians 703
Paramedics 116
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the New England Journal of Medicine stated that "more than 7,000
health care workers have AIDS . . . and an additional unknown
number have HIV infection."""0 These figures do not take into ac-
count any underreporting, which is estimated at approximately
20%,101, it is further estimated that health care workers are less
likely than other AIDS patients to report intravenous drug use." 2
The above figures show an increase over the January 1989 reported
cases of approximately 3,500 HIV-infected health care workers, 0 8
and although estimates are in conflict on this issue, it is reported that
approximately 5.4% of all health care workers have AIDS, compared
to 5.7% of the work force at large. 04
Calculation of the actual risk of HIV transmission from health
care worker to patient involves the examination of several factors.
The first factor is the rate of exposure of the health care workers'
bodily fluids to those of the patient.106 Although the statistics vary on
this factor, studies indicate that surgeons and dentists will cut a glove
in one of every four cases and will sustain a significant skin cut in
one of every 40 cases.1 06 More conservative estimates, as presented
during the Seventh International Conference on AIDS in Florence in
June of 1991, place the median risk of injury at 12 injuries per
1,000 operating room hours, or .012 per hour of surgery.107 The
second factor, also presented at the conference, is the risk that a sur-
geon is infected with HIV 08 Although difficult to evaluate, the
CDC estimates that five per 1,000 surgeons, or .005 are infected
Therapists 319
Dentists and Hygienists 171
Surgeons 47
Misc. (administrators, social workers, etc.) 1,680
TOTAL 6,436
100. Richard N. Danila et al., A Look-Back Investigation of Patients of an HIV-In-
fected Physician 1406 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 (1991).
101. Isaacman, supra note 46, at 443 n.25.
102. Id. at 441 n.13.
103. Id.
104. Gostin, supra note 75, at 15. The authors of one casebook estimate health care
worker infection percentages at .07%, challenging Gostin's estimate of 5.4%. CLOSEN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 179 ("The claim that one-twentieth of the work force at large and HCWs are
HIV-infected is incredulous. Indeed, in the calculations presented by Gostin, the numerator..
may have been placed over the wrong denominator.").
105. Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional, 151 ARCHIVES OF IN-
TERNAL MEDICINE 663, 663-64 (1991).
106. Id. at 664.
107. Four to Five Patients A Year May be Infected During Surgery, supra note 94, at
151.
108. Id.
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with HIV.0 9
The third factor, that of the risk of HIV transmission to the
patient after exposure or injury in the operating room, is under great
debate because researchers originally used rates of seroconversion
based upon health care worker exposure to HIV-infected patients.11°
These figures, it is argued, depict a greater rate of seroconversion
because the nature of health care worker exposures pose a greater
potential for a transfer of greater amounts of the virus (i.e. per
hollow needle sticks).' Whereas some commentators use the range
of .03 to 0.9 percent probability that a health care worker will con-
tract HIV following a documented case of percutaneous or mucous
membrane exposure,"' others argue that the lower figure should be
halved, resulting in a one in 11.1 million chance per hour of surgery
that HIV transmission from any given surgeon to patient would oc-
cur.118 If the surgeon is HIV-infected, only two probability factors
are used to determine the risk of infection, estimated at one in
48,000 per hour of surgery." 4 In conclusion, it is estimated that four
to five patients a year may be infected during surgery."' These
figures are similar to those estimated by the CDC, which concedes
that additional data are still needed on the frequency of injuries
among dentists as well as more details as to the risks associated with
particular surgical procedures.'"
Although these figures are the subject of debate among medical
scholars, others are quick to emphasize that the cumulative risk that
one patient of an HIV-infected surgeon will contract HIV is within
a range that justifies public concern and public health policy precau-
tions."' In addition, as modeled upon documented HBV transmis-
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Gostin, supra note 75, at 17.
113. Four to Five Patients A Year May be Infected During Surgery, supra note 94, at
151-52 (emphasis added). This figure is calculated by multiplying the risk of injury (.012) by
the risk of physician infection (.005) by the risk of seroconversion after exposure (.0015). Id.
114. Id. at 152. This figure is calculated by multiplying the risk of injury (.012) by the
risk of seroconversion after exposure (.0015). Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Gostin, supra note 105, at 664 (emphasis added).
In another journal, Professor Gostin outlines the figures involved in a surgeon's cumula-
tive risk of infecting his patients: "Assuming that the surgical patient's risk [of contracting
HIV from the surgeon] is exceedingly low (1/130,000), the risk that one of his patients will
contract HIV becomes more realistic the more operations he performs-1/13,000 (assuming
100 operations) or 1/126 (assuming 500 operations)." Larry Gostin, HIV-infected Physicians,
and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Procedures, HASTINGS CTR. Rpr., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at
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sion, it is argued that HIV-infected physicians and dentists will
transmit in clusters, further increasing the probability of infecting
their patients.1 8
Is the CDC being over-cautious regarding the risk of HIV
transmission from health care worker to patient? This, too, is an-
other area of controversy. Many professionals do not believe the
CDC's attribution of Dr. Acer's patients' HIV to their dental
care. '19 Others allude to the fact that the CDC may be overcompen-
sating for their past mistakes of being too slow and overly cautious in
releasing potentially controversial data. 2 Still others point out that
early in the history of the epidemic the CDC lost public trust by
making bald assurances that there was no risk of transmission
through transfusions or blood products. 2
The CDC's DNA studies revealed that the viruses of the dentist
and his HIV-infected patients were within a range difference of
3.4%;122 an extent of similarity expected for epidemiologically-linked
individuals.12 And as to patients "A,' 'B," and "C," Acer's viral
sequence was closer to each of the three patients than their DNA
sequences were to each other. 24 These findings suggest that cross
contamination between patients was a less likely route of HIV trans-
mission in Acer's office than direct blood-to-blood transfer from the
32, 33.
118. Gostin, supra note 105, at 664.
119. Gerbert, supra, note 32, at 1847; see also Hirsch, supra note 9, at 325. The au-
thor notes:
The danger of catching a disease at the dentist's office was first noticed in 1974,
when it was discovered that a healthy-looking .. .dentist .. .had infected 55
patients with hepatitis B over a three-year period. Eight other local outbreaks of
hepatitis B have been traced to dentists since then.
Id.
120. Id.
121. Isaacman, supra note 46, at 454.
122. Harold L. Hirsch, A Visitation with AIDS, Part IX, 37 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q.
110, 110 (1990).
123. Gerbert et al., supra note 32, at 1847.
Although a full discussion of genetic linking of viruses is beyond the scope of this article,
the average difference between Acer and his five patients is reported between 2.5% and 4.6%.
According to specialists in the Los Alamos National Laboratory, HIV viral sequences from
mothers to babies have been shown to vary by 3% to 6%. When comparing viral sequences
found in infected women and unrelated babies, sequences can vary from 12%-16%. In addition,
the HIV sequence of the dentist and the five patients shared a signature pattern that has not
been found in any other HIV sequence published in the National Laboratory's data base. For
more information on this topic, see Four to Five Patients a Year May be Infected During
Surgery, supra note 94, at 157.
124. Unreported Findings Shed New Light on HIV Dental Case, 6 AIDS ALERT (Am.
Health Consultants, Atlanta, Ga.), July, 1991 at 128.
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dentist to his patients.1" ' This area, namely the route of HIV trans-
mission, is another area of medical speculation and debate. Those
doubting the possibility of health care worker to patient transmission
insist that Acer must have transmitted HIV to his patients through
the use of improperly sterilized equipment, and that the case is in
effect one of patient to patient transmission.' 26
The CDC is not certain of the mode of HIV transmission from
Dr. Acer to his patients, but theories offered, given the closeness of
his viral strain to that of the infected patients, include injury of Acer
during an invasive procedure during which he bled into each pa-
tient's mouth;127 treating his lover and not properly sterilizing the
equipment afterward; 28 treating himself and not properly sterilizing
his equipment afterward;' 29 and, the most chilling of all, intention-
ally injecting his infected blood into each patient.'30
The CDC's guidelines are consistent with recent policy state-
ments issued in January of 1991 by both the American Medical As-
sociation (AMA) and the American Dental Association (ADA). In
acknowledging that the new policy was created in response to the
CDC reports on dentist to patient transmission of HIV, the AMA
policy stated:
HIV-positive [physicians] have an ethical obligation not to en-
gage in any professional activity which has an identifiable risk
of transmission ... to the patient .... [R]ecent cases of possible
dentist-to-patient transmission have caused some uncertainty
about the risk of transmission . . . under certain circumstances.
In cases of uncertainty about the risks to patient health, the
125. Id. at 122.
126. Hysteria Trumps Reason on Health Worker Policy, supra note 95, at 6.
127. Unreported Findings Shed New Light on HIV Dental Case, supra note 124, at
124-25.
128. Id. at 123.
129. Lawrence Kaltman, An Aids Puzzle: What Went Wrong in the Dentist's Office,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1991, at C3.
130. Unreported Findings Shed New Light on HIV Dental Case, supra note 124, at
137. This last theory, although appearing extreme, was offered by medical researchers believ-
ing that Acer was "a militant, meaning he wanted to make a statement.., that he deliberately
infected these people." Id.
An equally chilling theory is that Acer may have used "contaminated instruments some of
which may have been used to cauterize his lesions." Sari Staver, CDC Still Backing HIV
Restrictions, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEws, Nov. 18, 1991, at 31 (quoting ADA Trustee Walter
F. Lamacki).
Although a thorough discussion of the implications of AIDS "dementia" affecting a physi-
cian's practice is beyond the scope of this article, it is an area of growing concern among those
who believe that physicians should be required to disclose their HIV status to patients and
employers.
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medical profession, as a matter of medical ethics, should err on
the side of protecting patients ....
Consequently, until the uncertainty about transmission is re-
solved, the [AMA] believes that HIV-infected physicians should
either abstain from performing invasive procedures that pose an
identifiable risk of transmission, or disclose their seropositive
status prior to performing a procedure and proceed only if there
is informed consent. 1
The ADA, stating that the risk of dentist to patient HIV trans-
mission was "infinitesimal," nonetheless also recommended that
HIV-infected dentists should refrain from performing invasive pro-
cedures or should disclose their seropositive status until the uncer-
tainty regarding possible transmission is resolved.1"2 In response to
the CDC's initial reports of the Acer case in July of 1990, the Surgi-
cal Infection Society, the Society of Thoracic Surgeons, the American
College of Surgeons, and the American Academy of Orthopedic Sur-
geons recommended to the CDC that "the public would best be pro-
tected if infected surgeons no longer operated."' 3
In July of 1991 when the Bergalis case, the new CDC guide-
lines, and proposed legislation were topics covered on a daily basis in
newspapers across the country, the AMA reiterated its policy, stating
that those members who flouted recommendations to refrain from
invasive procedures or warn their patients could be accused of "un-
professional conduct, an offense punishable by every state licensing
board in this country.'
134
Four months later, in response to continued requests that medi-
cal professional associations assist the CDC in compiling the list of
"exposure-prone invasive procedures" as the July guidelines re-
quired,' the majority of the country's leading medical and dental
groups criticized the CDC for attempting to develop such a list with-
out more scientific data."3 " These groups also insisted that factors
such as a surgeon's individual technique must be considered in deter-
131. AMA Statement on HIV-Infected Physicians, 6 AIDS ALERT, Feb. 1991, at 24.
132. ADA Statement on HIV-Infected Dentists, 6 AIDS ALERT, Feb. 1991, at 24. But
see infra note 315.
133. Surgical Associations: Don't Operate if Infected with HIV, 5 AIDS ALERT, OCt.
1990, at 181.
134. Martin Tolchin, Stricter Action by Hospital Predicted After AIDS Votes, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 20, 1991, at A13.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
136. CDC Revises Recommendations on HIV-Infected Providers, 7 AIDS ALERT, Jan.
1992, at 1-3.
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mining whether a procedure poses a significant risk to patients.1 37
Only the AMA expressed continued support for the CDC's July
guidelines and its plans to compile such a list, with a spokesperson
stating that "it is simply unacceptable for the medical profession to
stand by, wait, and watch for possible cases of health care workers
infecting patients with HIV in order to bring more scientific confi-
dence to our recommendations .... Ambiguity or uncertainty should
be resolved in favor of our patients' interests."' 8
On June 18, 1992, the CDC stated that it would not modify its
July guidelines and that it would not develop a national list of expo-
sure-prone procedures. " 9 . The CDC decided instead that state
health departments should decide on a case-by-case basis which, if
any, procedures are exposure-prone, taking into consideration factors
such as the specific procedure, as well as the skill, technique, and
possible impairment of the infected health care worker. " "
VI. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION: "FIRST Do No HARM"
"First, do no harm," the basic tenet of the Hippocratic oath,
was used repeatedly in the discussions of proposed legislation in both
houses of Congress in the summer and fall of 1991. " ' On July 18,
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 5 (quoting AMA trustee Nancy Dickey, M.D.).
139. CDC Not Publishing Revised Guidelines on Infected Workers,supra note 6 (ern-
phasis added). This announcement was made in a letter dated June 18, 1992 which was sent
from William L. Roper, M.D., M.P.H., the director of the CDC to each state health officer.
The letter reflected the controversy surrounding the compilation of such a list and revision of
the original guidelines, and state in part:
After careful review and consideration, we have decided not to modify the July
12, 1991 recommendationns. Our review of state guidelines, with respect to
their equivalency to the July 12 recommendations, will give appropriate consid-
eration to those states that decide that exposure-prone invasive procedures are
best determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the specific
procedure as well as the skill, technique, and possible impairment of the in-
fected health care worker.
Id. at 115. Commentators note that "[b]y not coming out with a national list of exposure-
prone procedures, the CDC has essentially revised the July 1991 guidelines." And a spokes-
man, Kent Taylor, stated that the CDC decided not to publish revised guidelines because it
didn't want to further confuse the issue and create more controversy. Taylor stated that the
decision was based on the agency's inability to satisfy all of the medical groups commenting on
the guidelines, and that although the letter sent to state health departments doesn't state specif-
ically that the CDC is not planning to develop a national list of exposure-prone procedurees,
the agency has abandoned the idea. Id. at 114.
140. Id. at 113.
141. The Honorable Senator Edward Kennedy, D-Massachusetts, in opposition to the
Helms amendment and in support of the "leadership amendment" stated: "The first require-
ment of the health profession and of any doctor is to 'Do no harm.' That should also be the
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1991, Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) introduced onto the
Senate floor an amendment to an appropriations measure for the
Treasury Department and Postal Service which included language
calling for prison terms for health care workers with AIDS who fail
to notify their patients of their condition.1" 2 The measure specifically
made it a "[flederal crime for a doctor, dentist or other health care
professional who has AIDS and knows it to perform invasive medi-
cal procedures without informing the patient," and imposed maxi-
mum fines of $10,000 and maximum prison terms of ten years.14 In
support of the amendment, Senator Helms emphasized that the mea-
sure did not require mandatory testing and noted that the inspiration
for the amendment was Kimberly Bergalis, who "[f]or the last few
months ... has taken her struggle to the American people, demand-
ing that HIV-infected doctors, dentists, and health care workers be
required to disclose their condition to their patients."144
Helms criticized physicians who "recklessly expose thousands of
innocent Americans to this deadly disease," and stated that to do so
"is a vile act which should be rooted out and punished."' 46 In con-
clusion, Helms admitted that the "vast majority [of physicians] have
honorably abided by the opening sentence of the Hippocratic Oath:
'I shall first do no harm.' However," he emphasized, "there are a
few people in the medical establishment who have thrown away
their oath and duty to others."' 4
In opposition to the Helms amendment, and in support of a bi-
partisan leadership amendment that would require States to adopt
the July 1991 CDC guidelines or risk losing public health funds,
Senator Edward Kennedy criticized the Helms measure as "pur-.
port[ing] to give peace of mind to patients by terrorizing physicians
requirement for any action by Congress on this critical and highly charged emotional issue:
'Do no harm.'" 137 CONG. REC. S10332 (daily ed. July 18, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
Dr. George Bohigian, a witness in the House of Representatives in support of the "Ber-
galis Bill" sponsored by the Honorable William E. Dannemeyer (R-California), testified on
September 27, 1991, as follows: "Physicians should be the leaders in determining their HIV
status. As a profession, we need to hold ourselves up to a high standard. Remember, Hip-
pocrates said, 'First, do no harm.'" Philip J. Hilts, AIDS Patient Urges Congress to Pass
Testing Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at A12.
142. Kitty Dumas & Julie Rovner, Helms Wins Big on AIDS Issue, But Victory May
Not Last, CONG. Q., July 20, 1991, at 1978.
143. 137 CONG. REC., S10322-31, S10333, S10363 (daily ed. July 18, 1991).
144. Id. at S10334.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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and other health care workers. ' 147 "Our alternative," he stated, "...
would enact the best recommendations of our public health experts
by implementing the new guidelines issued by the CDC.' ' 4 8 The
Senator further criticized the Helms amendment as doing "nothing
to protect the health of the American people,"149 and because it pun-
ished HIV-infected health care workers who knowingly practiced, he
noted its potential to "seriously undermine the willingness of health
care workers to seek HIV testing when they know they have been
placed at risk." ' 50 In closing, Senator Kennedy made the following
statement:
The choice we face is clear. Either we will vote to instill fear
and avoidance among physicians and other health care workers
...or we will vote to strengthen our health care system and
make it safer for everyone by adopting these guidelines ....
To vote for penalties in the Helms amendment is a mockery of
the CDC guidelines, and dashes any hope of their implementa-
tion in a sound and rational manner . . . .This is a public
health problem, not a criminal law problem.151
Both measures were passed in the Senate, the Helms measure
by a vote of 81 to 18, and the leadership measure by a unanimous
vote of 99.152 Before their debate in the House, both measures were
the target of criticism and speculation. Helms' critics accused the
Senator of having as his primary aim "not to protect the public
health but to demonize and scapegoat HIV-positive doctors, particu-
larly those who are gay."" Others noted that "hospitals are going
to have no choice but to become tougher, 1 5 4 while officials predicted
that "hospitals will take action whether or not the Senate bills be-
come law."' 55 The consensus was that "the Senate was responding to
public opinion, to assure that they were on record as doing every-
thing possible to reassure the public.'1 5 6
As the two appropriations amendments were introduced into the
House for further debate and House approval, so too was the
147. Id. at S10332.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at S10332.
152. Id. at S1022-48, S10363, D923.
153. Hysteria Trumps Reason on Health Worker Policy, supra note 95, at 6.
154. Tolchin, supra note 134, at 13 (quoting Fred Entin, General Counsel of the
American Hospital Association).
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting Dr. James S. Todd, Executive Vice President of the AMA).
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"Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Providers' Protection Act of
1991," sponsored by Representative William Dannemeyer (R-Cali-
fornia). 157 The bill was an amendment to the Public Health Service
Act that was designed to protect patients from infected health care
providers and to protect health care providers from infected pa-
tients." For patient protection the bill required that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services:
1) publish a list of communicable diseases that pose a risk to the
public health (to include HIV and hepatitis B);
2) list invasive procedures that an infected health care worker
would be prohibited from performing;
3) list the categories of health care providers that should be sub-
ject to the above provisions; and
4) specify the frequency of testing required for each disease and
category of health care worker.1 59
The bill also required for further patient protection that states
accepting funds under the Ryan White law160 must require:
1)testing of certain health care providers as determined by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services;
2) that infected providers refrain from performing invasive pro-
cedures for the duration of the disease unless the provider in-
forms the patient of his.HIV status and obtains the patient's
express written consent to perform the procedure;
3) require employers of infected providers to help such provid-
ers make the necessary professional adjustments to deliver
health care in a capacity consistent with the protection of public
health; and
4) guarantee that patients of infected providers be informed of
their possible exposure to the disease and be offered counseling
and testing for such disease."'
For the protection of the health care provider against infected
patients, the secretary was to list relevant diseases and medical pro-
cedures that pose a risk to the provider. 6" He was also to authorize
nonconsensual testing of patients where (1) the provider has consent
to perform the invasive procedure creating the risk; (2) the provider
has a reasonable basis for believing that the patient has the disease;
157. H.R. 2788, 102d CONG., 1st Sess. (1991).
158. Id. at 2-15.
159. Id. § 2648A, at 2, 3.
160. Ryan White Law, Pub. L. No. 101-381.
161. H.R. 2788, supra note 157, § 2648A, at 4-7.
162. id. § 2648B.
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(3)the provider only test for such diseases as there is reasonable ba-
sis; and (4) the test results are subject to state confidentiality
protection. 6
The hearings on the Bergalis' bill were extensively covered in
the media and were the target of attack by those who believed that
the Bergalis case was "being used by the right-wing forces to rekin-
dle some of the fear . . lurking . . . about AIDS."' 4 Ms. Bergalis
herself, weakened by the ravages of the disease, testified in Congress
in support of the bill, stating: "I didn't do anything wrong ....
Please enact legislation so other patients and health care providers
don't have to go through the hell that I have.' ' 6 5 By early October
headlines stated: "AIDS Battle Reverting to 'Us Against Them,' "
and news stories reported that the right-wing was using "innocent
victims" to advance their agenda as opposed to "others" (homosexu-
als and drug addicts) who were somehow to blame for their
plights.' 66 The extremeness of this battle was revealed by those who
referred to "Kimberly-mania", 67 or others who suggested that the
question that the Bergalis case raises is "have we been lied to about
the way we can get AIDS?"' 68
The outcome of the Bergalis bill was that Representative Henry
A. Waxman, (D-CA) chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Health and the Environment, which oversees all health legislation in
the House, would not allow a vote on it.'69 Congressman Dan-
nemeyer believes that there is tremendous support for the bill and
will reintroduce it when the proper legislative opportunity arises.' 70
As to the two appropriations amendments, the Helms bill was
defeated17 ' and the "leadership" bill was compromised to require
states, within one year of the date President Bush signed the bill into
law on October 28, 1991, to either adopt the CDC guidelines or
163. Id. § 2638B.
164. Hilts, supra note 141, at A12.
165. Id.
166. Richard L. Berke, AIDS Battle Reverting to 'Us Against Them,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 1991, § 4, at 1.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Telephone interview with Bret Barbre, Special Assistant to Congressman William
E. Dannemeyer, 39th Dist. (Jan. 23,1991)
170. Id. In our discussion, Mr. Barbre outlined that the bill has to be attached to the
proper "vehicle," i.e., another bill that is germane to the topic that Congressman Dannemeyer
is presenting. Id.
171. Philip J. Hilts, Congress Urges that Doctors be Tested for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1991, at A18.
1993]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
their equivalent at the state level. 172 The law requires that the states
certify to the U.S Department of Health and Human Services that
they have instituted an appropriate policy on HIV-infected health
care providers; and the director of the CDC is to judge whether
states have adopted such equivalent guidelines should they choose
not to adopt those of the CDC. 17' Although the equivalency criteria
were originally undetermined when the guidelines were first re.-
leased, 17' the CDC eventually decided that "[e]quivalency will be
decided on a case-by-case basis."17 5 States that fail to make this cer.-
tification will risk losing money under the Public Health Service
Act.1 76 And commentators speculate that the states will be able to
satisfy the new "equivalency" requirements even if their guidelines
are more lenient or more restrictive than the CDC's.
177
Thus, at the conclusion of the 1991 legislative sessions of Con-
gress, a uniform federal policy as to how to regulate HIV-infected
health care providers was proposed and defeated. What remains is
state regulation that should be the equivalent of the CDC guidelines.
And after a year of controversy surrounding the July 1991 guide-
lines, during which it was reported that they were under revision,178
the CDC announced that it would continue to follow the 1991
guidelines but not develop a national list of exposure-prone proce-
dures as originally recommended.179 Instead it is now up to state
health departments to decide on a case-by-case basis which proce-
dures are exposure-prone, taking into consideration the sspecific pro-
cedure, as well as the skill, technique, and possible impairment of
172. CDC Questioned as State Responses to Guidelines Vary, 7 AIDS ALERT, (Am.
Health Consultants, Atlanta, Ga.), Jan. 1992, at 1, 7. The "leadership" bill was passed as a
provision of the 1992 Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act,
Section 663 of Public Law 102-141. AIDS ALERT, supra note 6, at 113-115.
173. CDC Questioned as State Responses to Guidelines Vary, 7 AIDS ALERT, supra
note 6 at 1, 7, (Jan. 1992).
174. Id.
175. AIDS ALERT, supra note 6, at 117, quoting CDC spokesman Kent Taylor: "How
the CDC will determine equivalency is somewhat unclear. "In the [June 18, 19921 letter sent
to state health officers, those officers are asked simply to check a block next to a statement
saying they have accepted the CDC guidelines or their equivalent." Id. at 117.
176. Id. Under the Public Health Service Act, states receive several million dollars in
grants from the CDC, the National Institutes of Health, the Health Resources Services Ad-
ministration, and other health agencies. Id.
177. Id. (quoting Professor Larry Gostin, executive director of the American Society of
Law and Medicine and adjunct professor of Health Law, Harvard School of Public Health).
178. Id. at 1. AIDS Alert emphasized that these changes were in draft form and that
they received a copy of the draft from a source not connected to the CDC. They also reported
that the CDC has released a statement saying that it has revised its July 1991 guidelines.
179. See supra notes 139 and 140 and accompanying text.
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the infected health care worker.1 80 In addition, the worker's ability
to continue to practice is to be evaluated upon factors such as indi-
vidual technique, experience and infection control compliance.1 '
Critics accuse the CDC of "throw[ing] the issue of HIV-in-
fected health care workers into the laps of the states" because the
CDC did not develop their guidelines based on sound public health
policy.'8 2 Others, such as health officials in California, insist that
"no scientific data exist to show that automatic restrictions are war-
ranted or disclosure necessary."' 8 3 And an advisory council to the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) has
asked the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to ap-
point a non-government panel to review data on the risk of HIV
transmission in health care settings, because they believe that the
CDC "bowed to political pressure in making its recommendations"
rather than basing them on available scientific evidence."'
180. Id. In the summer of 1992, conflicting reports still existed regarding the CDC's
position. In June, 1992, one commentator wrote:
The July 12 recommendations achieved the force of law in October 1991, when
Congress required state public health officials to certify that the recommenda-
tions or equivalent guidelines would be instituted within one year. . . .Most
likely, since the CDC appears to have backed away from the recommendations,
the federal government will accept state certification without rigorous
interpretation.
Frank S. Rhame, Preventing HIV Transmission, 91 POSTGRADUATE MED., 15, 15 (June
1992).
In August, 1992, another commentator reported:
The Centers for Disease Control has abandoned its controversial attempt at na-
tional policymaking for employment of HIV-infected health care workers. State
health departments were notified in June that they and local health authorities
should make their own decisions. The agency is standing by its 1991 guidelines
which recommended that professionals voluntarily seek testing if their work
poses the possibility of their blood contacting a patient's tissues, cavities, or or-
gans. Infected practitioners were urged to stop performing high-risk procedures
unless they got clearance from a panel of local experts and written permission
from patients. But health care groups rebelled when they were asked to help
draw up a list of "exposure-prone procedures;" many flatly refused to comply,
contending that the guidelines are too restrictive and that the risk of worker-to-
patient transmission is minuscule. With no consensus in sight, "we thought it
appropriate to take the middle ground and leave it up to the local review panels
to decide on a case-by-case basis," a CDC spokesperson said.
Newscaps, 92 AM. J. NURSING 65, 65 (1992).
181. CDC Questioned as State Responses to Guidelines Vary, supra note 172, at 1.
182. Id. at 6 (quoting Michael Carbine, director of the bureau of HIV/AIDS for the
Pennsylvania Department of Health).
183. Id. at 8 (quoting Mark Madsen, California Medical Association's director for phy-
sician education).
184. Id. at 10 (quoting NIAID Council Member Janet Mitchell, MD, Chief of Per-
inatology for the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Harlem Hospital in New
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Today, existing state policy varies as to the regulation of HIV-
infected health care providers. Illinois and Alabama have policies
that go beyond the CDC guidelines by requiring public health offi-
cials to review the records of HIV-infected providers and to notify
patients treated by them if deemed necessary. 8' Texas has turned
the CDC guidelines into law by subjecting providers who fail to
comply to disciplinary measures by licensing authorities.' A bill
that was introduced into the Texas Legislature in 1990 that would
have made it a crime for HIV-infected professionals to perform inva-
sive procedures did not pass." 7 New York, on the other hand, re-
jected the CDC guidelines in early October 1991, when State Health
Department officials released a policy proposal that required all
health care workers to take a formal course in infection control.' 88 In
addition, New York officials proposed the development of review
panels that would determine whether infected providers pose a sig-
nificant risk to patients and should be restricted.' 89 And infected
workers who violate these recommendations could be cited for pro-
fessional misconduct-but the system is voluntary and depends upon
the willingness of infected providers to submit their cases to review
panels; infected workers are under no obligation to inform their pa-
tients of their status.'90 Michigan's policy is also based upon follow-
ing infection control procedures and emphasizes the need for medical
devices that will reduce the risk of HIV transmission in health care
settings.' 9' Other states, such as Pennsylvania, have yet to make final
decisions on how they will respond to the guidelines.' 92
Today the issue of restricting HIV-infected health care profes-
sionals is the subject of ongoing debate, with the ultimate responsi-
bility as to how to resolve this difficult question left to the states
themselves. The courts, in response to restrictive hospital policies,
have relied upon common law principles and constitutional analysis
in determining whether such policies will be upheld.
York).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 10.
188. Keven Sack, Albany Plans to Allow Surgery by Doctors With the AIDS Virus,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at Al.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. CDC Questioned as State Responses to Guidelines Vary, supra note 172, at 8.
192. Id. at 6.
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VII. RECENT CASE LAW REGARDING RESTRICTIONS UPON
HIV-INFECTED HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
The first issue addressed in the cases that have discussed restric-
tions of HIV-infected health care workers is whether such policies
and practices are discriminatory.""3 Analysis of these cases therefore
is discussed by examining federal and state antidiscrimination law.
Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in
1978 (the Act), 9 prohibits discrimination in employment, housing,
and access to facilities on the basis of handicap and applies to the
federal government, federal contractors and those entities receiving
federal assistance.' 95
A. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline
In the context of cases involving HIV-infected health care
workers, the threshold question is whether AIDS or HIV infection
constitutes a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act. This issue was
indirectly addressed by the United States Supreme Court in School
Board v. Arline,'96 in which the Court determined that contagious
diseases were covered under the Act. 197 Ms. Arline, a schoolteacher,
was fired after suffering a third relapse of tuberculosis, and the
School Board admitted that it had fired her because they feared her
contagiousness threatened her students.'98 The Coutt "held that an
individual with a contagious disease . . . was a handicapped person
protected under the ... Act, and that discrimination based on fear of
contagiousness of the disease was actionable . .. ,," "In a footnote,
193. See the cases discussed infra in text accompanying notes 190, 220 and 258.
194. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), as amended by the Rehabili-
tation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-602, § 119, 92 Stat. 2955.
195. A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 156. The language of
the Act used by the courts in assessing a Section 504 claim is as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States ... shall,
solely by reason of his or her handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
196. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
197. Id. at 289.
198. Id. at 276, 281.
199. A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note2, at 159. "In so holding, the
Court explicitly rejected the reasoning of [a 1986 U.S. Department of Justice memo] which
had argued ... that discrimination based on fear of contagiousness... as [opposed] to discrimi-
nation based on the impairment itself was not actionable." Id. at 158-59 n.19.
For a full discussion of the Department of Justice's 1986 memo see Walter B. Connolly,
Jr. & Alison B. Marshall, An Employer's Legal Guide to AIDS in the Workplace, 9 ST.
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[however, the Court specifically] . . . noted that it was not deciding
the issue of whether HIV-infected people [were] protected under the
... Act because the facts before it did not" require such a ruling.200
The second issue addressed by the Arline Court was whether
persons with infectious diseases are "otherwise qualified" for em-
ployment as required by the Rehabilitation Act.20 1 The Court deter-
mined that such individuals would be otherwise qualified for their
employment if they did not pose a "significant risk" of communicat-
ing the disease.20 2 In determining a standard of significant risk the
Court adopted guidelines formulated by the American Medical Asso-
ciation, including an assessment of the mode of transmission of infec-
tion, the duration of contagiousness, the severity of harm to third
parties, and the probability that the disease would be transmitted."0 '
The Court further emphasized that whether "an individual is other-
wise qualified will depend on the facts of the individual's particular
case."
204
The Court noted that the final step in the "otherwise-qualified"
inquiry is to evaluate whether, in light of the medical findings listed
above, the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee. 08
The Court also specified that "[a] person who poses a significant risk
of communicating an infectious disease to others in the workplace
will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accom-
modation will not eliminate that risk."2 ° Because the Court lacked
sufficient findings as to the severity of Arline's condition and the
probability of whether she would transmit the disease, it concluded
Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1990) (footnotes omitted) (first alteration in origi-
nal)(quoting Memorandum from Charles J. Cooper to Robert E. Robertson (June 20, 1986)
(available from the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Wash., D.C.).
200. A.B.A. AIDS COORDINATING COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 159.
201. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 288.
204. Connolly & Marshall, supra note 199, at 566-67.
205. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288. The Court clarified pertinent terms, citing its prior deci-
sions to do so:
"An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap." ... When a handicapped person is not
able to perform the essential functions of the job, the court must also consider
whether any "reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable the
handicapped person to perform those functions... "[W]here reasonable accom-
modation does not overcome the effects of a person's handicap, or where reason-
able accommodation causes undue hardship to the employer, failure to hire or
promote the handicapped person will not be considered discrimination."
206. Id. at 287 n.16.
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that it was unable to rule as to whether she was otherwise qualified,
and remanded the case for further findings of fact. 07
In March of 1988, Congress codified the Arline decision in the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,20' amending the critical defini-
tion of a handicapped individual to include people with contagious
diseases, while excluding those whose conditions would either endan-
ger themselves and/or others or would render them unable to per-
form their jobs. 209 The Act stated that section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act is "applicable to a person with a contagious disease if he or
she does not pose a 'direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals.' "210 And the congressional history of the Act shows that
the language "direct threat" embodies the standard of "significant
risk" of transmission articulated by the Arline Court.2"'
In the context of applying the Rehabilitation Act to the medical
setting, recent decisions have interpreted the provisions pertaining to
recipients of federal assistance to include hospitals and physicians
receiving Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. 2  In addition,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 1 ' which was signed
into law on July 26, 1990 and goes into effect in stages until Janu-
ary, 1993, prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the
public and private sector in the areas of employment, public accom-
modations, transportation, and public services.""' The Act specifi-
cally pertains to HIV-infected individuals and uses the basic legal
framework of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in defining
"handicaps" as well as incorporating the "otherwise qualified" anal-
207. Id. at 288-289. On remand, the district court held that Arline was an otherwise
qualified person under the Act and ordered that she be reinstated to her position as a school
teacher. Arline v. School Board, 692 F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
208. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-
32 (1988); see Connolly & Marshall, supra note 199, at 567.
209. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 9.
210. Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive
Procedures, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 32, 37 (quoting Civil Rights Resto-
ration Act of 1989, § 9).
211. Id.; Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16.
212. Wyld & Cappel, supra note 47, at 102.
213. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327.
214. Id. Starting in January, 1992 (eighteen months after its enactment), customers and
clients can use the ADA against discriminatory public accomodations. By July, 1992, any
business that employs between 11 and 25 people cannot discriminate against individuals with
disabilities; and by January, 1993, the ADA will apply to all businesses employing 10 or
fewer people. Id.; see also New Federal Law Protects People with HIV Disease, 6 AIDS
ALERT 50, 51 (1991); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project, 263 JAMA 2086,
2087 (1990).
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ysis articulated in Arline."5
The ADA also uses the same standards as the Rehabilitation
Act in determining that a person with a contagious disease will not
be "otherwise qualified" if he or she poses a "direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the work place." 216 The
ADA adopts the Arline standard as does the Rehabilitation Act by
defining "direct threat" as a "significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accomodation. "217
The ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, contains direct restrictions
on pre-employment inquiries and HIV testing, specifically forbid-
ding inquires of employees as to whether they are disabled or as to
the nature or severity of a disability, unless such inquiries are
"shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. '2 1
Many "state courts have ruled that AIDS is a protected handi-
cap under [their] applicable handicap discrimination statutes, [and]
unlike the Federal Rehabilitation Act, [most] state handicap statutes
apply to all private employers within a state. 21 9 "Although there is
no common definition of handicap under state discrimination stat-
utes, many states follow the Rehabilitation Act's definition," while
others have no definition whatsoever.22 To date, the case law re-
garding restrictions of HIV-infected health care workers have
reached consistent decisions as to the violation or non-violation of
both state and federal antidiscrimination law. 2 Prior to the passage
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, state law would have had a
broader application to the private sector, but this has been of little
consequence in the health care setting where most hospitals and pri-
vate physicians qualify for application of the Rehabilitation Act be-
cause they are recipients of federal funds.222 In summarizing the ap-
plication of antidiscrimination law to the issue of HIV-infected
health care workers, a noted commentator has concluded:
215. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 101(8).
216. Id. § 103(b); see HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 10, at §§ 10:05, :07.
217. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, at § 101(3).
218. HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 212, § 10:06 (quoting Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990, § 102(c)(4)(A)).
219. Id. § 10:06.
220. Id. § 12:21.
221. See Doe v. County of Cook, No. 87 Civ. 888 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 5, 1990), re-
printed in CLOSEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 668; Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center, 592
A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (where the court left uncertain whether its stan-
dard under New Jersey Law was the same as that of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
222. Wyld & Cappel, supra note 47, at 102; see also supra text accompanying note
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Physicians, then, have a right under federal and state handicap
laws not to be denied the right to practice medicine or to be
reassigned to an administrative position unless there is a signifi-
cant risk of HIV transmission. Any limitation on the right of a
physician to practice must be reasonably related to the achieve-
ment of greater patient safety. Narrow limitations on the prac-
tice of seriously invasive procedures may thus be found not to be
discriminatory.228
B. Doe v. County of Cook
The first case involving an HIV-infected health care worker
that was decided based upon the language of Arline was Doe v.
County of Cook," 4 in which U.S. District Court Judge John A.
Nordberg required the signing of a consent decree to protect an
HIV-infected neurologist from unreasonable limitations placed on
his right to practice.22 The plaintiff, a physician at Cook County
Hospital in Illinois, alleged in his complaint that because he had
AIDS the hospital had restricted his clinical privileges in a manner
which effectively prevented him from providing any direct care to
patients.2 2 6 The plaintiff brought his action on the basis of handicap
discrimination in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 7
Prior to the plaintiff's filing of his action, the defendant hospi-
tal, in implementing the recommendations of a hearing committee
appointed pursuant to their bylaws, prohibited Dr. Doe from per-
forming certain invasive procedures. 228 Two months later, the hospi-
tal partially restored the plaintiff's clinical privileges and required
him to comply with CDC universal precautions; in addition, the hos-
pital required him to "double-glove" for certain invasive proce-
dures. 229 The hospital stated that the restoration of partial privileges
was due to "further individual evaluation of his condition. '280
In the consent decree the physician agreed to be subject to spe-
cial surveillance, to double glove before performing invasive proce-
dures, and not to perform muscle biopsies, sural nerve biopsies or
223. Gostin, supra note 210, at 37.
224. Doe v. County of Cook, No. 87 Civ. 888 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 5, 1990).
225. Gostin, supra note 210, at 37.
226. Doe v. County of Cook, No. 87 Civ. 888 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 5, 1990).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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cerebral arteriographies..23  The judge held, in language similar to
that in Arline, that future alterations regarding the physician's prac-
tices could be permitted only if the physician posed a "significant
health or safety risk to himself or others."28 In stating the criteria of
a "significant risk" the court specified that it would be determined
with "reference to the state of medical knowledge regarding: (1) the
nature of the risk; (2) the duration of the risk; (3) the severity of the
risk; and (4) the probabilities that AIDS or a related condition perti-
nent to plaintiff will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of
harm."28
C. Leckelt v Board of Commissioners of Hospital District No. 12"4
In Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners of Hospital District
No.1, a federal district court in Louisiana, held that a hospital did
not violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when it terminated
a male nurse for refusing to reveal the results of an HIV test. 235 In
addition, the court held that the employer did not violate the em-
ployee's equal protection or privacy rights because the hospital's in-
fection control policies were rationally related to the legitimate state
interest of protecting patients, and the plaintiff did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his test results.2 6 The Leckelt case
is perceived as extremely important by many commentators who be-
lieve that it could set precedent for restrictive HIV-infected health
care worker policies.
23 7
In Leckelt, the plaintiff was a licensed practical nurse whose
duties included making rounds, performing assessments, giving medi-
cation (orally and by injection), starting I.V.'s, changing dressings,
performing catherizations and giving enemas.238 Prior to the com-
231. CLOSEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 669.
232. Doe v. County of Cook, No. 87 Civ. 888, at 669.
233. Id. at 670.
234. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs. of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 714 F. Supp. 1377 (E.D. La.
1989).
235. Id. at 1378.
236. Id. at 1390-91.
237. See HERMANN & SCHURGIN, supra note 216, § 10:16 (stating that the case is "a
possible sweeping decision"); see also Closen, A Call for Mandatory HIV Testing and Re-
striction of Certain Health Care Professionals, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 421, 433 (1990)
(calling for mandatory testing and restriction of certain health care professionals). This article
cites Leckelt as "caselaw support[ing] the view that an HCP [health care professional] with
HIV might create a risk of transmission to patients during invasive procedures." Id. The
author believes that the "logical extension" of the court's ruling is to urge HIV testing of
HCPs who undertake invasive procedures.
238. Leckelt, 714 F.Supp. at 1382.
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mencement of plaintiff's action against the hospital, his roommate
and lover of eight years died of AIDS and plaintiff decided to have
an HIV test performed.2"9 In the context of how the case was de-
cided, it is important to note that the plaintiff never received his
HIV test results.240
The medical center was informed of the plaintiff's lover's death
by the acting chief of staff who reported that the medical staff be-
lieved that the plaintiff's health status should be determined. 241 This
request was consistent with the hospital's infection control policy,
which required that employees report any infectious or communica-
ble disease to their employee health service.242 Once such reports
were made, testing of employees was conducted where indicated and
employee test results were evaluated by the employee health nurse
and the individual's physician.24 An individual who had a commu-
nicable disease was required to receive clearance from his physician
prior to returning to active employment.244 If the employee was ab-
sent from work due to an infectious disease, he was paid sick bene-
fits, and working restrictions were placed on employees as their dis-
ease indicated, including reassignment to areas not associated with
direct patient care.245
In addition, those infectious employees who were allowed to
work in direct patient care were required to closely follow universal
precautions to decrease potential risk to others.246 The defendant's
employee handbook outlined this policy and further stated that em-
ployees committing serious infractions of the hospital policy were
subject to immediate termination, with insubordination being listed
as a serious offense.24 When asked to submit his test results, the
plaintiff did not do so, and the hospital later learned that for several
years the plaintiff had been a carrier of hepatitis B, and had suffered
a syphilis infection without informing the hospital as policy re-
quired.248 On these grounds, as well as plaintiff's failure to report to
work, plaintiff was terminated for insubordination. 49
239. Id. at 1383.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1379.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1379-80.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1384.
249. Id. at 1384-85. The court also found that the plaintiff consistently failed to use
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In rendering its decision, the court analyzed the 1985 CDC pre-
cautions regarding occupational risks and potential reassignments of
HIV-infected employees.250 Although the precautions stated that
testing of HCWs who perform invasive procedures was "under con-
sideration," as was whether additional restrictions of them were
warranted, the precautions did state that because of the increased
risk of the HIV-positive HCW's susceptibility to other diseases, the
HCW's personal physician and the hospital's appropriate staff
should evaluate whether the HCW could adequately and safely per-
form patient-care duties or should be reassigned work duties. 51 The
court also relied heavily upon medical experts who concluded that it
would be impossible to follow CDC precautions regarding HIV-in-
fected employees unless the health care facility knew the health care
worker's status.25 2
In reaching its decision, the Court granted the defendant great
deference in establishing its hospital policy:
Under nationally followed guidelines hospitals may have to
modify the duties of employees with certain infectious diseases..
. . In order to implement these guidelines ...a hospital may
need to require medical testing for an employee whom it learns
has a high medical risk of having such diseases .... Because a
hospital has a right to require such testing in order to fulfill its
obligation to its employees and to the public concerning infec-
tion control and health and safety in general, plaintiff's em-
ployer was justified in terminating him.258
In finding that the hospital had not violated the Rehabilitation
Act, the court outlined the elements necessary for such a claim and
ruled that the plaintiff did not prove the first element, that the de-
fendants had perceived him as handicapped. 54 The court found that
"no evidence was produced .. .that anyone involved in the decision
to discharge plaintiff had ever concluded that he was seropositive."25
Further, the hospital's intention if he tested' positive was that "he
should be placed on immediate leave with pay pending further re-
view," thus providing evidence that the defendants did not intend to
barrier precautions when treating patients. Id. at 1383.
250. Id. at 1381-82.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1379.
254. Id. at 1385-86.
255. Id. at 1386.
[Vol. 33
HEALTH CARE
immediately terminate plaintiff based on his HIV status.25 6
In outlining the second element, the court concluded that the
plaintiff did not prove that the hospital discharged him solely be-
cause of his handicap:
When an employer has a lawful motive for discharging an em-
ployee, the employer's coincidental consideration of the em-
ployee's handicap does not prevent the employer from acting on
its lawful motive . . . . Defendants . . . testified that plaintiff
was terminated for failure to follow hospital policy and not be-
cause he was perceived to be seropositive for HIV.2 7
Regarding the third element, that of whether the plaintiff was
"otherwise qualified" to continue his duties, the court ruled that the
plaintiff's refusal to comply with hospital infection control policies
rendered him not "otherwise qualified" for the job:
Essential to the function and purpose of such a public safety
sensitive institution as a hospital is the adherence by the hospi-
tal employees to infection control policies . . .
[O]pportunities exist for the transmission of HIV from health
care workers to patients such that hospitals must monitor em-
ployee's health status (especially those in high risk groups) and
their use of barrier precautions.25e
In addition, the court noted, the Arline decision "clearly en-
dorsed an employer's right to inquire into the health status of its
employees and to make reasonable accommodations for that em-
ployee's handicap;259 the defendant's request for the plaintiff's test
results was nothing more than "the first step in this inquiry.260 In
summation, the court stated that the defendants had a "legitimate
and nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff" and that
his claim failed under Louisiana handicap law for the same reason
that it failed under federal law.26'
D. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton26 2
In April of 1991, the New Jersey case of'Estate of Behringer v.
Medical Center at Princeton was decided. Although the plaintiff
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1387.
259. Id. at 1389.
260. Id. at 1388.
261. Id.
262. In re Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. L. 1991).
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brought his claim under state antidiscrimination law, the terms of
the law are similar to those of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
except that New Jersey limits claims to places of public accommoda-
tion.2 8 Here, the court ruled that the defendant hospital qualified as
a place of "public accommodation" and thus was prohibited from
discriminating.2"4 At issue in the case were the hospital's policies re-
stricting the HIV-infected plaintiff's privileges to practice surgery
and the requirement that he obtain informed consent from his pa-
tients before performing invasive procedures.26 In addition, the
plaintiff sued the hospital for breach of confidentiality of his AIDS
diagnosis.2 6
The plaintiff was an otolaryngologist and plastic surgeon who
was also a member of the staff at the medical center.26 Upon learn-
ing of his diagnosis with AIDS, the president of the medical center
immediately directed the cancellation of the plaintiffs surgical
cases.268 This initial decision, the president admitted, was based
upon a primary concern for the medical center's liability and was
made with little knowledge or information on the potential transmis-
sion of the disease." 9 When the chief of surgery reached a contrary
result urging that the plaintiff resume his surgical practice, the mat-
ter was brought before the hospital's board of trustees.2 70
As an interim measure prior to establishing a new policy on
HIV-infected health care workers, the board voted to require the use
of a special "informed consent form" to be presented to all patients
about to undergo surgery by HIV-positive surgeons. 71 The form in
essence stated that the patient had been informed of the doctor's
HIV-positive status and of the potential risk of transmission of the
virus and under those terms consented to the procedure. 272
Over the next year the board of trustees and the executive com-
mittee of the medical staff met to discuss the medical and ethical
implications of the possible transmission of HIV during invasive
procedures, as well as the questions raised by the informed consent
263. David Orentlicher, HIV-Infected Surgeons: Behringer v. Medical Center, 266
JAMA 1134, 1136 (1991).
264. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1252.
265. Orentlicher, supra note 263, at 1134.
266. Id.
267. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1254.
268. Id. at 1257.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1257.
271. Id. at 1258.
272. Id.
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issue.17 This series of meetings included presentations by represent-
atives of the American Medical Association, and the hospital's epide-
miologist, ethicists and legal counsel.2 4 In June of 1988, the hospital
adopted a policy that stated that an HIV-positive health care worker
"may continue to treat patients ... but shall not perform any proce-
dures that pose any risk of transmission to the patient."" 5 The pol-
icy specifically forbade certain surgical procedures and included a
procedure for recredentialling of physicians:
A known HIV seropositive member of the Medical and Dental
Staff may be permitted to continue to admit and care for his
patients in the hospital, but shall immediately suspend the per-
formance of all surgical procedures, including surgical assisting.
In addition, he shall not perform any procedures that involve
piercing the integument, including IVs and phlebotomy ....
The staff member's Department Chairman may re-credential
the member . . . with regard to allowing procedures in accor-
dance with [this] policy.27 '6
In addition, the interim requirement that HIV-infected surgeons dis-
close their status to their patients and obtain their informed consent
remained.27
In deciding the case, the court addressed the "conflict between a
doctor's rights under . . . [antidiscrimination] law and a patient's
right to know under the doctrine of informed consent. '217 The court
summarized its holding as follows:
[1] Plaintiff, as an AIDS-afflicted surgeon ... was protected by
the Law Against Discrimination.
[21 The Medical Center met its burden of establishing that its
policy... was substantially justified by a reasonable probability
of harm to the patient.
[3] The "risk of harm" to the patient includes not only the ac-
tual transmission of HIV . . . but the risk of surgical accident
• . . which may subject the patient to post-surgery HIV testing.
[4] Defendant . . . properly required plaintiff, as a physician
with a positive diagnosis of AIDS, to secure informed consent
from any surgical patients.27 9
273. Id. at 1259.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1260.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1254.
279. Id. at 1255.
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As to whether the plaintiff's antidiscrimination claim would
stand, the court acknowledged that "courts should allow hospitals, as
long as they proceed fairly, to run their own businesses. '" 0 And the
court determined that the test to be applied in the context of restrict-
ing an HIV-infected surgeon was
whether the continuation of surgical privileges, which necessa-
rily encompasses invasive procedures, poses a 'reasonable
probability of substantial harm' to others, including co-employ-
ees and, more importantly, patients. [Citations omitted] There
must be a 'materially enhanced risk of serious injury.' [Citations
omitted]. And ... there must be a distinction between the risk
of an incident taking place and the risk of injury from such an
incident. 81
In assessing these dual risks the court emphasized that (1) not
enough adequate study had been done regarding the risk of HIV
transmission; 282 (2) that the risk of transmission from the plaintiff to
his patients would steadily increase as he performed more opera-
tions;2 3 and (3) much of the plaintiff's surgery involved contact with
his patients' mucous membranes, tissues that are relatively suscepti-
ble to HIV transmission. 84
Of particular interest in the case was the court's view that the
risk of transmission of the HIV virus was not the sole risk threaten-
ing patients.28 The court reasoned that a surgical accident could
"subject a previously uninfected patient to months or even years of
continual HIV testing . . . with the attendant anxiety of waiting for
test results, and the possible alterations to life style and child-bearing
during the test period, even if those results ultimately are nega-
tive."28 In addition, the court emphasized that in spite of the inabil-
ity to precisely quantify the probability of HIV transmission, the
extent of harm once a patient becomes HIV positive is death.287 In
further assessing this issue the court used a risk-benefit analysis,
weighing the risk posed by the HIV-positive provider against the
value of having these same providers performing invasive proce-
dures. 28 8 In citing a well-known commentator, the court concluded
280. Id. at 1276.
281. Id.
282. Orentlicher, supra note 263, at 1134.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. In re Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. L. 1991).
286. Id. at 1279-80.
287. Id. at 1282.
288. Id. at 1281.
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that "restrictions due to HIV positivity will only interfere with the
provision of a very small fraction of the total health care services. All
of these services can be adequately provided by non-infected
practitioners. 28
9
In its closing analysis, the court pointed to the ethical aspects of
the physician-patient relationship, stating that "a small but palpable
risk of transmitting a lethal disease to the patient gives the doctor an
ethical responsibility to perform only procedures that pose no risk of
transmission. "290 And, the court concluded, the only safeguard
against "physician self-interest" lies in making patients the final de-
cision makers:
If there is to be an ultimate arbiter of whether the patient is to
be treated invasively by an AIDS-positive surgeon, the arbiter
will be the fully-informed patient. The ultimate risk to the pa-
tient is so absolute-so devastating-that it is untenable to ar-
gue against informed consent combined with a restriction on
procedures which present 'any risk' to the patient. 91
The Behringer decision has been noted for adhering to the ethi-
cal principle that patient welfare must be the primary concern of
physicians.292 But it has also been subject to criticism for establishing
a "zero-tolerance risk standard that restricts health care workers
from performing procedures that pose any risk of transmission. "993
And it is uncertain if the Behringer court's finding of a reasonable
probability of substantial harm under New Jersey antidiscrimination
law would meet the "significant risk" of transmission standard under
the Rehabilitation Act or the "direct threat" exception of the
ADA.294 But the court's message seems clear: restrictions on HIV-
infected health care workers can be implemented in the interests of
patient welfare.
E. Application of Hershey Medical Center v. Doe295
The July, 1991 case of Application of Hershey Medical Center
v. Doe, although decided on the basis of Pennsylvania's Confidential-
289. Id. at 1282 (citing Keyes, Health Care Professionals with AIDS: The Risk of
Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of Professionals and Institutions, 16 J.C. &
U.L. 589, 603 (1990)).
290. Behringer, 592 A.2d. at 1282.
291. Id. at 1283.
292. Orentlicher, supra note 263, at 1134.
293. Id. at 1135.
294. See supra notes 202-206, 216-218, and accompanying text.
295. In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. v Doe, 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. 1991).
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ity of HIV-Related Information Act,296 is pertinent to this analysis
because it acknowledged the current conflicting inquiries surround-
ing restriction of HIV-infected health care workers. Dr. Doe, a resi-
dent physician in obstetrics and gynecology, sustained a cut through
his surgical glove during an invasive internal procedure, exposing a
patient to his infected blood.297 The following day he submitted to a
blood test for HIV and when he found out that his test results were
positive, he voluntarily withdrew from participation in further surgi-
cal procedures. 9
After extensive investigation, the medical center identified 279
patients who were treated by Dr. Doe; the issue before the court was
thus whether the disclosure of Dr. Doe's identity in the follow-up
contacts the hospital conducted to inform patients of their possible
HIV exposure was in violation of the state's Confidentiality Act.2 9
In determining that disclosure of Dr. Doe's identity was necessary,
the court ruled that the hospital had sustained its burden of demon-
strating the "compelling need" standard required by the Act. 00 In
reaching its decision, the court reviewed recent decisions by other
courts and concluded that the hospital had the duty to insure their
patients' health to the best of their capabilities. 0 ' The court further
stated that a hospital "impliedly assures its patients that they will
receive safe and adequate medical care." '0 2
The court reasoned that although it was "unfortunate that Dr.
Doe will be made to suffer personally and/or professionally as a
result of his illness . . . societal implications [must [be] con-
sider[ed§."3 3 The court further found that Dr. Doe's decision to vol-
untarily withdraw from his residency program was admirable be-
cause he presented a health risk to others."0 " But the court further
stressed that "Dr. Doe's medical problem was not merely his. It be-
came a public concern the moment he picked up a surgical instru-
ment and became a part of a team involved in invasive
procedures."30 5
296. The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
7601-7612 (Supp. 1992).
297. In re Hershey Med. Cr., 595 A.2d. at 1291.
298. Id. at 1292.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1294.
301. Id. at 1295.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1297.
304. Id. at 1298.
305. Id.
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The court limited its holding to the narrow issues on appeal
and chose to make additional comments on the AIDS dilemma in its
footnotes:
[W]e note the new Federal guidelines, recommended by the
[CDC] on July 15,1991 . . . [which] recommend that infected
individuals not participate in invasive procedures absent permis-
sion from an expert panel and notification to the patient ....
• ..The task of resolving these most pressing inquiries rests
with our Legislature and the appropriate medical committees,
associations and boards.306
In closing, the court stated:
AIDS is not a disease that is, or that should be taken lightly by
our society. Rather, many view it as a problem of epidemic pro-
portion that knows no bounds and discriminates against no one.
Although HIV has been extensively researched, the public, jus-
tifiably or not, is wary and frightened of its prevalence in our
society.
[T]his court has put public opinion aside and has at-
tempted to balance the competing interests in this case carefully
and thoroughly .... [Tihe public's right to be informed in this
sort of potential health catastrophe is compelling and far out-
weighs a practicing surgeon's right to keep information regard-
ing his disease confidential.117
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the above court decisions illustrate, the general trend in case
law regarding restrictions placed on HIV-infected health care work-
ers is to assess, on an individual basis, the procedure performed by
the employee and the risk of HIV transmission to patients. But to-
day, the actual risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to
patient is a topic of scientific debate, and the statutory terms of "sig-
nificant risk of transmission,"808 "direct threat to the health and
safety of others," 309 and "reasonable probability of substantial
harm"3' 0 place the burden of scientific uncertainty and debate upon
the courts. The courts, as the Behringer and Hershey Medical
Center decisions illustrate, assess the probability of HIV transmis-
306. Id. at 1298-99 nn.14, 18.
307. Id. at 1301-02.
308. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 281-284 and accompanying text.
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sion against the outcome of such transmission-death-and find even
the lowest probabilities unacceptable. Here, the courts believe, such
an apportionment of risk can only be justified by the patient's in-
formed consent." 1'
Commentators point out that terms such as "significant risk"
need further scientific clarification, and that cases on health care
worker restrictions are frequently decided on the outcome of the
"battle of the expert witnesses," whose opinions on HIV transmis-
sion reflect the current debate that is raging in the medical field. 1 '
Many believe that case-by-case determinations of which medical pro-
cedures are sufficiently safe for HIV-infected health care workers to
perform belong not with the courts, but with the medical community,
and demand that clear professional guidelines be promulgated to de-
termine how this controversy shall be resolved." 3 But, as this article
has illustrated, professional guidelines and recommendations regard-
ing HIV-infected health care workers are also the subject of contro-
versy, and many medical associations have refused to assist the CDC
in developing a list of invasive procedures from which HIV-infected
health care workers should refrain. 1 4
As of October 28, 1991 states had one year to adopt the CDC
guidelines or their equivalent,"' and after a year of controversy and
rumors regarding revision of the July 1991 guidelines, the CDC de-
cided not to modify them and to place the responsibility on state
health departments to determine which procedures are exposure-
prone.31 The federation's position was updated in an April 1992
policy statement which recommended that:
[a]ll physicians should comply with the guidelines established by
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) for preventing the
transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and of
Hepatitis B virus (HBV) to patients, and physicians who are
infected with HIV or with HBV ... should not perform expo-
sure-prone procedures as defined by the CDC except within
311. See supra notes 285-291 and accompanying text.
312. Gostin, supra note 210, at 37. In the Behringer case for example, the defendant
hospital used Dr. Lorraine Day, a contemporary San Francisco orthopedic surgeon who
prepares for surgery in a "space suit designed to prevent the migration of HIV from her
patients to her in blood or in aerosols." Albert Jonsen, Is Individual Responsibility a Suffi-
cient Basis for Public Confidence?, 151 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 660, 660 (1991).
313. Gostin, supra note 210, at 38.
314. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text; see also supra note 180 (conflict-
ing reports on the status of the guidelines).
316. See supra notes 139, 140, 180, and 181 and accompanying text.
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guidelines set by the state medical board." '
Thus, hospitals are waiting to see what the outcome of the
HIV-infected health care worker debate will be. And, as the Behr-
inger case illustrates, hospital legal counsel are advising their clients
to closely examine legal doctrines such as that of informed consent to
limit their exposure to liability.
What is the standard of care that would determine liability
should a patient acquire HIV from his or her physician? In general,
the standard of care is set by the medical profession, administrative
sources, and occasionally, by the courts. 18 As of January, 1992, the
AMA has stood firm on its recommendations that physicians have an
ethical obligation to either refrain from invasive procedures or obtain
informed consent for such procedures if they are HIV-positive."'
The ADA, which in January of 1991 endorsed similar recommenda-
tions, has reversed its position, recommending that HIV-infected
dental health care workers who perform invasive procedures "should
practice only under the evaluation and monitoring of their personal
physician and/or under recommendations of public health officials,
expert review panels, or in compliance with institutional policies."82
In October of 1991, the Federation of State Medical Boards of the
United States recommended that states should require doctors who
perform exposure-prone procedures to be tested for HIV, and those
infected "should not be allowed to perform surgeries except in re-
317. THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS, POLICY STATEMENT RELATED
TO THE PREVENTION OF HIV/HBV TRANSMISSION TO PATIENTS (1992).
The Policy Statement further recommends that state medical boards should have the following
powers and responsibilities:
1. to encourage that physicians doing exposure-prone procedures know their
HIV and their HBV status;
2. to require reporting to the state medical board and/or the state public health
department of HIV and HBV infected physicians;
3. to ensure confidentiality of those reports received by the state medical board
and/or state health department under #2 above;
4. to establish practice guidelines for HIV and for HBV infected physicians;
5. to monitor, or the state public health department monitor, the practices and
health of HIV and HBV infected physicians.
Id.
The Federation noted that the above recommendations should also apply to all other per-
sons regulated by the state medical board. Id.
318. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 469.
319. CDC Revises Recommendations on HIV-Infected Providers, 7 AIDS ALERT (Am.
Health Consultants, Atlanta, Ga.), Jan. 1992, at 1,5; see also supra notes 131-138 and accom-
panying text.
320. CDC Revises Recommendations on HIV-Infected Providers, supra note 318, at 1,
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stricted circumstances."' '21
The CDC guidelines are consistent with the AMA's recommen-
dations and the American Hospital Association's recently released
policy endorses all aspects of the CDC guidelines except the require-
ment of patient informed consent.3 22 The position of the AHA is that
if "it is determined by an expert panel that a health care worker can
practice, there is no need to notify the patient of the health care
worker's status and obtain the patient's consent for invasive proce-
dures."" ' This statement is consistent with those who argue that the
doctrine of informed consent should not shield the medical profession
from exposing patients to significant risk.3 24 These commentators ar-
gue that "if one believes that the risk is significant, then one ought
not to subject one's patient to it regardless of his/her consent.132 5
Will hospitals over-compensate for the lack of scientific cer-
tainty regarding HIV-infected health care worker to patient trans-
mission and impose greater and greater restrictions upon their HIV-
infected employees? Although the answer to such a question involves
speculation in the midst of political and medical controversy, hospi-
tals will be restrained in doing so by their consciences, anti-discrimi-
nation law, and changes in scientific data. Their motivation for
greater restrictions will be patient welfare and protection against lia-
bility, determined by the evolving standard of professional care.
Case-by-case assessments by expert review panels as recommended
by the CDC will require greater administrative responsibility, and it
is arguable that the hospitals will not be fully protected by a pa-
tient's informed consent should the patient acquire HIV from an in-
vasive procedure. In addition, any restrictions imposed by hospitals
in compliance with the CDC guidelines would still be subject to re-
view by the courts.
26
Some commentators argue that the "evolving standard of profes-
sional care is for an HIV-infected physician to refrain from perform-
321. Medical Group's AIDS Policy, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 6, 1991, at A3. It
should be noted that the federation's rules are not binding on any state, but carry considerable
authority. In addition to calling for mandatory testing of physicians, the guidelines would alse
set up a program of collecting the names of HIV-infected doctors and monitoring their prac-
tices. Id.
322. Telephone Interview with Ms. Jeanna Pugliese, Director of Infection Control,
American Hospital Association, Chicago Headquarters (Mar. 9, 1993).
323. Id. (quoting Ms. Pugliese).
324. David Price, What Should We Do About the HIV-Positive Health Professionals?,
151 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 658, 659 (1991).
325. Id.
326. See Orentlicher, supra note 263, at 1135.
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ing seriously invasive procedures." 2 ' Others speculate that "the
courts will likely decide that hospitals following the CDC guidelines
are not guilty of unlawful discrimination, [while] ... any restrictions
that go beyond the CDC guidelines would probably be
prohibited." 2 '
Is the question of whether an HIV-infected health care worker
should be restricted from invasive procedures purely an ethical one?
The AMA believes so, stating that "HIV-infected physicians have
an ethical obligation not to engage in any professional activity that
has an identifiable risk of transmission ... to the patient." ' 9 Den-
tists polled in August and September of 1990 believed that dentist-
to-patient transmission of HIV is unlikely, but still thought HIV-
positive dentists should refrain from practicing."' 0 And the American
Nurses Association has taken the position that a nurse is ethically
obligated to undergo HIV antibody testing when a patient has been
exposed to the nurse's blood or bodily fluids. 8 1 As Hershey Medical
Center revealed, physicians who voluntarily refrain from practicing
are often considered "admirable. '3 3 2
There are those who believe that individual responsibility in the
face of this chilling dilemma is not a sufficient basis for public confi-
dence and that the medical profession needs to assure the public that
its self-interests will not conflict with the welfare of patients. 8
There are physicians who, when questioned about their decisions not
to inform patients of their HIV-positive status, reply, "[B]eing alive
involves risk."" 34 Further, some leaders in associations of gay dentists
advise their HIV-positive colleagues "not to answer" when asked
327. Gostin, supra note 210, at 34.
328. Orentlicher, supra note 263, at 1135.
329. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
330. Gerbert et al., supra note 32, at 1848.
331. Karen Markus, Patients with HIV, CALIFORNIA NURSING, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 20,
20.
332. See supra text accompanying note 304.
333. Albert Jonsen, Is Individual Responsibility a Sufficient Basis for Public Confi-
dence?, 151 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 660, 660 (1991); see also Orentlicher, supra
note 263, at 1134.
334. Doctors with AIDS, supra note 67, at 57. this article quotes an anonymous doctor
who tested positive for HIV two years ago and is still healthy and not on medication. The
doctor "follows universal precautions to the letter," including hand-washing, gloves and
masks." Id. The following is an excerpt of his interview:
"Do I think there's no situation where HIV could be transmitted?" he asks.
"No there must be. But living in 1991 America puts you at risk for lots of
things. You could ride on a subway that catches on fire. You can be involved in
a car accident. Being alive involves risk."
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about their HIV status."' 6 Other physicians, however, state that if
they learned that they were HIV-positive that they wouldn't ask
their patients to take even a "minuscule" risk of infection,"' And an
ophthalmologist, testifying before Congress in support of the Bergalis
bill in September of 1991, stated: "[P]hysicians should be the leaders
in determining their HIV status. As a profession we need to hold
ourselves up to a high standard. Remember, Hippocrates said, 'First,
do no harm.' ""
The first five cases of dentist to patient transmission of HIV
have stirred controversy in medical and political arenas and specula-
tion as to how many additional patients could be infected each year.
As HIV continues to spread to the general population, the public is
questioning the medical and dental professions while demanding that
their political representatives protect them against the threats of such
a lethal disease. Leading medical and ethical scholars are calling for
an end to "HIV exceptionalism," noting that the efforts to sustain a
set of policies treating HIV infection as fundamentally different from
all other public health threats is becoming increasingly difficult."' 8
As the second decade of the AIDS epidemic begins, the contro-
versial issues raised by this disease must be addressed swiftly and
efficiently. Congress has taken the first steps toward this end by re-
quiring states to adopt CDC guidelines or their equivalent - and the
CDC must still shoulder the responsibility of determining
equivalency on a case-by-case basis. The CDC, subject to criticism
by medical associations, the public at large, and AIDS activists, will
struggle with conflicting medical opinions and limited scientific data
in implementing its guidelines. And the courts, in the series of cases
expected after individual states take action on the guidelines, will
balance competing interests in determining what risks to patients, if
any, are acceptable, and whether restrictions on HIV-infected health
care workers are fair, nondiscriminatory, and justifiable in light of
conflicting medical opinions and scientific uncertainty.
335. Mireya Navarro, Patients Grilling Health Care Workers on AIDS, N.Y. TMES,
Aug. 2, 1991, at BI.
336. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Angry Doctors Condemn Plans to Test Them for Aids, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug 20, 1991, at CI (quoting Dr. William Schecter, trauma surgeon at San Francisco
General Hospital).
337. Hilts, supra note 141, at A12 (quoting Dr. George M. Bohigian, a doctor of
opthalmalogy in St. Louis who testified for the Bergalis legislation).
338. Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to Exceptionalism?,
324 JAMA 1500, 1503 (1991)'.
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